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ARTICLE
A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE
EQUAL ACCESS ACT'S STANDARDS
GOVERNING PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENT
RELIGIOUS MEETINGS
NADINE STROSSEN*

Numerous disputes have arisenover the use of public secondary schools
for meetings by student religious groups. In every analysis of whether
schools should grant such access there are competing Free Speech Clause
and Establishment Clause concerns. Students could perceive a school's
granting access as state endorsement of religion. Conversely, prohibition
could result in the violation of students' free speech rights.
Congress attempted to deal with these concerns in 1984 by enacting the
Equal Access Act. ProfessorStrossen shows that the Act favors access in
situations where the Supreme Court has indicated that access is not
required by the Free Speech Clause and circuit courts have found that
such access would violate the Establishment Clause. In the absence of
any directly controlling Supreme Court precedent, Professor Strossen
attempts to reconcile the competing constitutional concerns involved in
equal access controversies. In doing so she offers guidance as to whether
and how schools should comply with the Act, given the inconsistencies
between the constitutional and statutory standardsfor resolving equal
access claims.

In the Equal Access Act (the Act),' Congress addressed a
controversial issue that has led to numerous disputes before
school boards and courts around the country: when a public
high school 2 allows voluntary, student-initiated, nonreligious
student groups to meet on school premises, should it grant equal

* Assistant Professor and Supervising Attorney, Civil Rights Clinic, New York University School of Law. B.A., Harvard-Radcliffe College, 1972; J.D., Harvard Law
School, 1975. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Catherine
Siemann and the secretarial assistance of Karen Hollins, Lori Pina, and Michael
Portantiere.
IPub. L. No. 98-377, 98 Stat. 1302 (1984) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1984)). The
Equal Access Act became effective in August 1984. For the text of the Act, see infra
note 164.
2This Article's analysis applies to schools containing lower grade levels, as well as
high schools (grades nine through twelve). The Article refers to high schools, however,
because they will probably receive the most access requests from voluntary, studentinitiated, religious groups.
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access to voluntary, student-initiated, religious student groups?3

Two federal judges have maintained that denying equal access
violates the Free Speech Clause. 4 However, all four courts of
appeals which have ruled on the issue have held that granting
equal access violates the Establishment Clause. 5
3 The equal access controversy concerns the free speech rights of organized student
groups rather than individual students or informal student groups. Religious expression
in public schools by individual students or informal student groups raises fewer Establishment Clause concerns. Cf.Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2496 (1985) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("Nothing in the United States Constitution as interpreted by this Court
...prohibits students in public schools from voluntarily praying at any time before,
during or after the school day."); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983) (government
aid received by parochial schools, under a statute allowing tax deductions for tuition
and related expenses, was "available only as a result of decisions of individual parents;"
therefore, no "'imprimatur of state approval' ... can be deemed to have been conferred" on religion).
4 Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 563 F. Supp. 697 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (Nealon,
C.J.), rev'd, 741 F.2d 538, 561 (3d Cir. 1984) (Adams, J., dissenting), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986) (school district's refusal to permit
wholly student-initiated nondenominational prayer club to meet during activity period
violated club members' free speech rights). The Free Speech Clause provides that
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
.... " U.S. CONST. amend. I. It is binding on the states, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697, 707 (1931), and protects the rights of individual students not only to engage in
religious expression, but also to associate for such purposes. NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
5 Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist. No. 70, 766 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1985); Bender,
741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School
Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982); Brandon v. Bd. of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir.
1980). The Establishment Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion ....
U.S. CONST. amend. I. It is binding on the states.
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
Although the Establishment Clause is usually invoked to challenge governmental
favoritism toward religion, it also prohibits governmental hostility toward religion. See,
e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). Most equal access opinions have not
discussed the Establishment Clause problems resulting from the denial, as opposed to
the grant, of access. However, in Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980), aff'd
sub. nom. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), the Eighth Circuit held that the
Establishment Clause required a public university to grant equal access to a student
religious group. See id. at 1317-18 (denial of equal access has the primary effect of
inhibiting religion, and "hopelessly entangles" a university in defining religion, determining whether proposed events involve religious worship, and monitoring events to
ensure no prohibited activity occurs).
Student religious groups seeking access to school premises have also based their
claims on the Free Exercise Clause, which provides that "Congress shall make no law
... prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Exercise
Clause is binding on the states. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,
211-12 (1948). However, the courts have consistently rejected the asserted free exercise
rationale for equal access. See Bell, 766 F.2d at 1400 n.6; Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1048;
Brandon, 635 F.2d at 976-78; Bender, 563 F. Supp. at 703. As one court of appeals has
explained,
[w]e do not challenge the students' claim that group prayer is essential to their
religious beliefs ....

[However,] the school's rule [prohibiting group prayer

on school property] does not place an absolute ban on communal prayer ....
While school attendance is compelled for several hours per day, five days per
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Reflecting asserted congressional concern for the high school
students' free speech rights, 6 the Act requires secondary schools
to grant equal access to any "noncurriculum related" student

groups, including religious, political, or philosophical groups, in
circumstances where such access would probably not be required under current Free Speech Clause doctrine. 7 In several
recent decisions, the Supreme Court has curtailed Free Speech

8
Clause protection of both access claims to government property

and public school students' speech. 9
Conversely, reflecting what some critics have described as
Congress's relative lack of concern for Establishment Clause
values, 10 the Equal Access Act purports to require schools to

grant equal access to student religious groups in certain circumstances under which circuit court rulings have held that such
access would violate the Establishment Clause," and Supreme
week, the students . . . are free to worship together as they please before and
after the school day and on weekends in a church or any other suitable place
Brandon, 635 F.2d at 977.
Although the majority in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), did not reach the
college student religious group's free exercise rationale for its equal access claim, the

sole Justice who did analyze that claim rejected it. Id. at 284 (White, J. dissenting).
6 See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. H7723-24, H7727 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of
Rep. Roukema (R-N.J.)); id. at H7724 (statement of Rep. Frank (D-Mass.)); id. at H7732
(statement of Rep. Goodling (R-Pa.)); id. at H7734-35 (statement of Rep. McEwen (ROhio)); id. at H7735 (statement of Rep. Eckart (D-Ohio)); id. at H7738 (statement of
Rep. Slattery (D-Kan.)); 130 CONG. REC. at S8337 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement
of Sen. Hatfield (R-Or.), the Act's Senate sponsor); id. at S8361 (statement of Sen.
Jepsen (R-Iowa)). See also President's Statement Upon Signing H.R. 1310 (Education
for Economic Security Act), 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1120, 1121 (Aug. 11, 1984):
"These provisions honor, in a public school setting, this country's heritage of freedom
of thought and speech, and I am delighted that they now become the law of the land."
Id.
7 See infra text accompanying notes 258-65.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 37-44.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 49-62.
10See, e.g., Boisvert, Of Equal Access and Trojan Horses, 3 LAW & INEQUALITY
373, 406 (1985) (The Equal Access Act's legislative history indicates that it is a "blatant
push to get religion into the public schools in violation of the Establishment Clause");
Teitel, The Unconstitutionalityof Equal Access Policies and Legislation Allowing Organized Student-Initiated Religious Activities in the Public High School: A Proposal
for a Unitary FirstAmendment Forum Analysis, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 529, 55659 (1985).
Some members of Congress viewed the Act as a backdoor attempt to inject organized
prayer into the public schools. 130 CONG. REC. S8352 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement
of Sen. Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)); see also id. at H7725 (statement of Rep. Schumer (DN.Y.) quoting the Reverend Jerry Falwell's comment that "[w]e knew we couldn't win
on school prayer, but equal access gets us what we wanted all along"); id. at H7733
(statement of Rep. Ackerman (D-N.Y.) referring to equal access bill as "the son of
school prayer").
11See infra text accompanying notes 69-87.
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Court rulings have indicated that access would at least raise
Establishment Clause problems.12

In light of the inconsistency between the Act's standards for
resolving equal access claims and judicial decisions enunciating

constitutional standards for resolving such claims, it is not surprising that decisions under the Act reflect differing views of its
constitutionality. 13 Faced with the competing constitutional considerations implicated in every equal access dispute, as well as
with conflicting directives from the courts and the Congress,
school officials, students, parents, and other concerned parties
had hoped that the Supreme Court would provide some guidance
for resolving these conflicts during its 1985 Term. The Court
had granted certiorari to review Bender v. Williamsport Area
School District,in which the Third Circuit had rejected an equal
access claim on Establishment Clause grounds, notwithstanding
its holding that the denial of access violated the students' free
speech rights.14 Although the events at issue in Bender occurred
before the Act's effective date, some parties concerned with the
equal access issue had hoped that the Court's ruling would
provide at least some indirect guidance concerning the Act.' 5

However, in March 1986, a narrow majority of the Court de12See infra text accompanying notes 28-33 & 68.
1 See infra text accompanying notes 193-232.
14 741 F.2d 535, 559 (3d. Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 56 (1986). Having
concluded that denying equal access to the students seeking to hold religious meetings
would violate their free speech rights, but that granting them equal access would violate
the Establishment Clause, the Third Circuit was faced with the issue of how to reconcile
these competing constitutional claims. It did so pursuant to a novel, open-ended balancing test:
[T]he appropriate analysis requires weighing the competing interests protected
by each constitutional provision, given the specific facts of the case, in order
to determine under what circumstances the net benefit which accrues to one
of these interests outweighs the net harm done to the other. Recognizing that,
under these circumstances, some constitutional protections must unavoidably
be abridged, we believe that our role is to maximize, as best as possible, the
overall measure of the fundamental rights created by the Framers, by deciding
which course of action will lead to the lesser deprivation of those rights.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Although the Third Circuit observed that the facts of the Bender case presented a
close question under its balancing analysis, it concluded that Establishment Clause
concerns outweighed free speech concerns. Id. at 559-60. However, the court emphasized that "[u]nder other circumstances, of course, this same analysis could work to
override the Establishment Clause, if a sufficiently compelling interest were shown."
Id. at 560. For the facts of Bender, see text accompanying note 78.
15 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Supporting Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari, at 2-9, Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 106 S. Ct. 1326
(1986) (No. 84-773)(contending that, if allowed to stand, Third Circuit decision would
cast doubt on Act's constitutionality, and would frustrate congressional objective of
resolving constitutional issues involved with minimal additional litigation).
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clined even to comment, let alone to rule, upon the merits of
6
the Bender case.1
Far from resolving the equal access controversy during its
1985-1986 Term, the Supreme Court increased the confusion
surrounding this controversy by issuing another decision, Bethel
School District v. Fraser,17 which significantly circumscribed
students' free speech rights. The rationale underlying Bethel
was that, due to their presumed immaturity, high school students
are likely to be emotionally harmed by, and therefore should be
insulated from, certain controversial speech. 18 This is directly
contrary to the rationale underlying the Equal Access Act,
which presumes that high school students are sufficiently mature
to be exposed to controversial speech.' 9
Because of the Supreme Court's failure to provide specific
guidance concerning high school equal access disputes, the numerous parties and courts that face such disputes have been
relegated to the various commentators upon the subject. A
school's ultimate concern in facing equal access issues must be
to comply with the general dictates of the Free Speech Clause
and the Establishment Clause, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court.2 0 The facts and circumstances that may be relevant to
these ultimate constitutional requirements cannot be codified
for all cases. Consequently, the Act's specification of criteria
for evaluating all equal access claims necessarily departs from
16Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986). The majority and

dissenting opinions are discussed infra at text accompanying notes 85-103.

17106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
,8 See infra text accompanying notes 56-62. But see infra note 60 (Bethel may reflect

the Court's special concern with shielding minors from sexually explicit speech).
29

The Equal Access Act's legislative history is replete with statements by members

of Congress repudiating the view that high school students are too immature or impressionable to be exposed to controversial speech. See, e g., H.R. REP. No. 710, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1984); 130 CONG. REC. S8359 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of

Sen. Hatfield); id. at S8363 (statement of Sen. Mitchell (D-Me.)); id. at S8366 (statement
of Sen. Grassley (R-Iowa)); id. at H7723 (statement of Rep. Frank); id. at H7727

(statement of Rep. Roukema).
20Any denial of equal access could be challenged under the Supreme Court precedents

limiting governmental discretion to impose content-based restrictions upon speech in
limited public forums, even absent any statute purporting to grant equal access rights.
See infra text accompanying notes 34-48. Under the Supreme Court decisions consis-

tently invalidating state-sanctioned religious expression in public schools on Establishment Clause grounds, see infra text accompanying notes 28-33, no such expression
could escape judicial scrutiny merely by virtue of general legislative authorization. See

Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist. No. 70, 766 F.2d 1391, 1407 (10th Cir. 1985)
(although state statute purportedly authorized religious expression by voluntary student

groups in public schools, equal access issue was reviewed solely on constitutional
grounds, with no discussion of statute).
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constitutional standards. 2' A school should comply with the

Act's specific standards only insofar as they are not inconsistent
with general constitutional principles.
This Article22 is intended, first, to fill the gap left by the
Supreme Court's failure to address the merits of Bender, by
articulating principles for reconciling the competing constitu-

tional concerns implicated in equal access controversies. The
Article's second purpose is to compare the proposed constitutionally-derived standards with those specified in the Act in
order to offer guidance about the respects in which schools
23
should or should not comply with the Act.
After sketching the constitutional underpinnings of the equal
access controversy, Part I briefly summarizes the specific constitutionally-based equal access case law. Part II shows why
constitutional principles require the resolution of any equal access case to be based upon the particular facts involved, rather
than according to categorical rules. Part III specifies evidentiary
standards for evaluating the facts surrounding any equal access
controversy consistently with constitutional precepts, and explains why the dispositive facts cannot be exhaustively
catalogued.
After analyzing the Act's provisions, as illuminated by its
legislative history 24 and the judicial decisions that have interSee infra text accompanying notes 233-35.
Some of the ideas discussed in this Article have developed out of issues previously
explored in Strossen, A Framework for Evaluating Equal Access Claims by Student
Religious Groups: Is There a Window for Free Speech in the Wall Separating Church
and State?, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 143 (1985).
2 Few works which analyze the Equal Access Act have been published, and none
compare the Act's standards for reviewing equal access claims with constitutionallybased standards. Nonetheless, several works have examined the Act from other perspectives. See Boisvert, supra note 10 at 375-79 (analysis of Act's legislative history
concluding that Act had pro-religious purpose, thus rendering it unconstitutional in its
entirety); Teitel, supra note 10 at 556-59; Note, The Equal Access Act: Is It A Solution
or Part of the Problem?, 8 GEORGE MASON U.L. REV. 353 (1986) (concludes that Act
is unconstitutional in its entirety, because it is inconsistent with current equal access
case law and fosters excessive entanglement between government and religion); Note,
The Equal Access Act: A Haven for High School "Hate Groups"?, 13 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 589 (1985) [hereinafter HOFSTRA Note] (focuses on Act's legislative history, and
concludes that "hate groups" cannot be excluded from student forum under Act); Note,
Using FederalFunds to Dictate Local Policies:Student Religious Meetings Under the
Equal Access Act, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 187 (1984) [hereinafter YALE Note]
(examines federalism and enforcement problems associated with Act, and concludes
that Act is potentially unenforceable).
24 A detailed analysis of the Equal Access Act's lengthy legislative history is beyond
the scope of this Article. At least two assessments of that history conclude that the
Act's purpose was to advance religion, and therefore any grants of access under it to
student religious groups would violate the Establishment Clause. See Boisvert, supra
note 10; Teitel, supra note 10.
2'
2
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preted it, Part IV contrasts the Act's framework for evaluating
equal access questions with the constitutionally-based framework proposed in Part III. Because the Act is more protective
of free speech values than of nonestablishment values, some
grants of equal access to student religious groups may comply
with the Act but violate the Establishment Clause; conversely,
some denials of equal access to student religious, political, philosophical, or other groups may comply with the Free Speech
Clause but violate the Act. Finally, taking into account both the
constitutionally-based standards and those aspects of the Act
that are consistent with these standards, Part V outlines the
options available to a public high school in determining its equal
access policies.
I.

CONSTITUTIONALLY-BASED

CASES PERTINENT TO EQUAL

ACCESS
A. Underlying ConstitutionalPrecedents
As the Third Circuit stated in Bender, the equal access issue
implicates "a constitutional conflict of the highest order. '2 5 Both
the nonestablishment and free speech concerns, which weigh in
favor of differing results, seem compelling. While the courts
have vigilantly protected Establishment Clause values in the
public school setting, 26 the denial of equal access suffers under
a double presumption of unconstitutionality as a content-based
prior restraint on free speech. 27

15Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 557 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986).
26 See

infra text accompanying notes 28-33. For a statement of the concerns under-

lying the strict judicial enforcement of the Establishment Clause in public schools, see
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-9, at 841 n.9 (1978):

[B]ecause of their central and delicate role in American life, public schools
must be insulated from religious ceremony under the aegis of the Establishment

Clause even where no coercion can be shown, whereas in other public forums,
free exercise values permit some accommodation of [religion]. ...
Id.
27 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (university's refusal to permit
religious student group to meet on campus constitutes prior restraint upon students'
expressive rights); accord Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972). Under the First

Amendment, a presumption of unconstitutionality attaches both to prior restraints, see,
e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam), and
to content-based regulations on speech, see, e.g., Police Department of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
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1. Establishment Clause Cases Concerning Religious
Expression in Public Schools
The Supreme Court has found an Establishment Clause
violation2 8 in nearly every case in which it has ruled upon statesanctioned religious expression on public school premises, even
where individual student participation was at least arguably voluntary. 29 Even though the Court has recently sanctioned chinks
in the metaphorical wall separating church and state in other

2 From at least 1971 until 1984, the Supreme Court consistently evaluated Establishment Clause issues under the tripartite test first specifically enunciated in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Lemon test provides that a government policy or
practice can pass muster under the Establishment Clause only if: (1) it has a secular
purpose; (2) its primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it does not
foster excessive entanglement between government and religion. Id. at 612-13.
In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court stated that it would no longer
be confined to the Lemon test in all Establishment Clause cases, id. at 679, although it
did not propose an alternative test and has subsequently continued to rely on Lemon.
See, e.g., Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for the Blind, 106 S.Ct. 748, 751
(1986); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S.Ct. 3216, 3222 (1985); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 2489-90 (1985).
Indeed, in one post-Lynch decision, the Court appeared to strengthen Lemon's purpose test, by emphasizing that any challenged policy or practice must have a "clearly
secular purpose." Wallace, 105 S.Ct. at 2490. Although the Court had employed the
"clear secular purpose" test in previous cases, see, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S.
39, 40-41 (1980) (per curiam) (invalidating statute mandating the posting of Ten Commandments in public school classrooms), Lynch had reverted to the weaker "secular
purpose" formulation. See Lynch 465 U.S. at 679 & n.6 (indicating that even a single
secular purpose, among many religious purposes, would suffice under this standard).
Perhaps the explanation for these shifting standards lies in the special strictness with
which the Court enforces the Establishment Clause in the public school context. In
another post-Lynch decision, the Court stressed that it has "particularly relied on Lemon
in every case involving the sensitive relationship between government and religion in
the education of our children." Grand Rapids, 105 S.Ct. at 3222.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lynch formulated a "clarified version" of
the Lemon test, 465 U.S. 688 n.*, under which the central issue is whether the challenged
governmental action is either intended to convey a message that the government endorses (or disapproves) religion, or is likely to be perceived as conveying such a
message. Id. at 691. The Court has regularly invoked this "clarified" Lemon test in
several post-Lynch Establishment Clause cases. See, e.g., Grand Rapids, 105 S.Ct. at
3223; Wallace, 105 S.Ct. at 2492-93.
29See, e.g., Wallace, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (1985) (striking down statute mandating moment
of silence for meditation or prayer); Stone, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968) (invalidating statute that prohibited teaching Darwinian evolution
theory); School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (prohibiting
organized, teacher-led classroom Bible readings); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)
(prohibiting organized, teacher-led classroom prayer); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333
U.S. 203 (1948) (striking down "released time" program under which religious teachers
provided religious instruction in public school classrooms during the school day to
students electing to attend). But see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding
program under which public school students, upon written request by their parents,
may leave school during school day and go to religious centers for religious instruction).
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0

its most recent pronouncements concerning public

school religious expression continue to reinforce that wall. 31 The
Court's chief concern in these cases is the risk that reasonable

students could perceive the school as endorsing or supporting
religion. 32 The Court has repeatedly expressed the fear that,
because of young people's particular impressionability, they
might be more likely than adults to perceive any religious expression on school premises as manifesting the school's ap33
proval of religion.
2. Free Speech Clause Cases Concerning Speakers' Access to
Public Property
The second significant body of Supreme Court precedent underlying the equal access issue is that concerning free speech

guarantees on government property. Although individuals have
" See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (rejecting Establishment Clause
challenge to city-sponsored nativity scene); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)
(rejecting Establishment Clause challenge to state-paid legislative chaplain); Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge to statute granting
tax deductions to parents for tuition and other expenses incurred in sending children to
parochial schools). See generally Redlich, Separationof Church and State: The Burger
Court's Tortuous Journey, 60 NOTRE DAME L. RaV. 1094 (1985); Teitel, The Supreme
Court's 1984-1985 Church-State Decisions: Judicial Paths of Least Resistance, 21
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 651 (1986).

11See Wallace, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985) (finding Establishment Clause violated by
statutorily mandated daily moment of silence in public schools, for meditation or prayer,
where legislative history indicated statutory purpose of promoting prayer). See also
Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3222 (1985) (holding Establishment Clause violated by
school district's adoption of two programs under which public school employees taught
secular subjects to nonpublic school students in classrooms leased from nonpublic
schools at public expense, stressing "sensitive relationship between government and
religion in the education of our children"); Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985).
31For a discussion of this policy concern, see, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 14-5
at 825 n.15.
31See, e.g., McCollum, 333 U.S. at 227 (Frankfurter, J., concurring): "That a child
is offered an alternative may reduce the constraint; it does not eliminate the operation
of influence by the school .... The law of imitation operates and nonconformity is not
an outstanding characteristic of children." Id.
The Court has also expressed the fear that, as a result of such perceived approval,
students adhering to a minority religion or students not adhering to any religion at all
might feel more alienated, or be more susceptible to indoctrination, than adults would
be. In McCollum, the Court asserted that:
[there] is an obvious pressure upon children to attend ....

The children

belonging to these nonparticipating sects will thus have inculcated in them a
feeling of separatism when the school should be a training ground for habits of
community, or they will have religious instruction in a faith which is not that
of their parents.
Id. at 227-28. See also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (distinguishing
between adults "not readily susceptible to religious indoctrination" and children subject
to "peer pressure").
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no general right of access to public property for purposes of
exercising their free speech rights, they do have such a right
with respect to some government property, under the "public
forum" doctrine. 34 Certain types of public property, such as
sidewalks, streets, and parks, have been deemed quintessential
public forums because they have traditionally been open for free
speech purposes.3 5 In addition, any other property that the government actually makes available for free speech purposes, even
without a history or tradition of openness, is also regarded as a
public forum. The government may not exclude or restrict
speech on the basis of its content in any public forum, unless
36
such action is necessary to promote a compelling state interest.
Until recently, the Supreme Court also recognized, as a subcategory of public forums, a "limited public forum": public property where access could be limited to certain categories of
speakers or subjects if "need[ed] to confine expressive activity
on the property to that which is compatible with the intended

uses of the property.

.-.

."37

Public schools which made their

facilities available to student groups were considered to have
created limited public forums, in that nonstudent speakers could
be excluded, and such exclusion was viewed as necessary to
preserve the school's educational function. However, a public
34 See generally, Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965
SuP. CT. REV. 1.
31This notion is eloquently expressed in Justice Roberts's oft-quoted dictum in Hague
v.CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939):
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from
ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of
citizens.
Id. at 515.
-1 For a discussion of the public forum doctrine, see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263, 267-68 (1981). But see Farber & Nowak, The MisleadingNature of Public Forum
Analysis: Content and Context in FirstAmendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REv. 1219,

1220 (1984) (although Supreme Court decisions in early 1970s began to espouse view
that First Amendment almost completely prohibited content-based speech regulation,
this approach never determined outcome of any cases, and has in any event become
riddled with exceptions); Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A
Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727, 727-31; Stephan, The FirstAmendment and Content
Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203, 205-06, 236 (1982).
37Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 3458 (1985)

(Blackmun, J., dissenting). For examples of limited public forums involving speaker
and subject matter limitations, see, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1983) (forum
limited to speech by university students); City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v.
Wisconsin Pub. Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (forum limited to
speech about school board business).
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school could not have limited the permissible subject matters
for such a forum unless it could have shown that any such
limitations were also necessary to preserve the school's edu-

cational function. Based upon this understanding of the limited
public forum doctrine, both the district

8

and circuit 39 courts in

Bender ruled that the exclusion of a student religious group from
a public school forum violated the students' free speech rights.

The Supreme Court's most recent decision concerning the
public forum doctrine, Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense &

Educ. Fund,40 was decided after the Third Circuit's ruling in
Bender and effectively eliminated the limited public forum as
an analytically separate category. 41 The Court indicated that so
long as property is not held open to the public at large, it would
be treated as a "nonpublic forum," and any access restrictions
to it would be subjected only to minimal scrutiny. 42 In Cornelius,
38563 F. Supp. at 705-06.

3 741 F.2d at 546-50.

105 S.Ct. 3439 (1985).

41See id. at 3450 -51. As the dissenting opinion noted,
[t]he Court's analysis empties the limited public forum concept of meaning....

The Court makes it virtually impossible to prove that a forum restricted to a
particular class of speakers is a limited public forum....

The very fact that

the Government denied access to the speaker indicates that the Government
did not intend to provide an open forum for expressive activity, and under the
Court's analysis that fact alone would demonstrate that the forum is not a

limited public forum.
Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3461 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).

41 Id. at 3450-51. The effective elimination of the limited public forum concept had
been foreshadowed in Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37
(1983). Perry held that the government's "selective" granting of access to certain mailboxes did not "transform" this property into any type of public forum. Id. at 47. Yet
the whole point of the limited public forum doctrine had been precisely to prevent the
government from granting free speech access on any "selective" or restrictive basis,
unless the government could prove that the access restrictions were necessary to
preserve the government property for its intended purposes. See supra text accompanying note 37.
The Perry Court also observed that even in a limited public forum, "the constitutional
right of access would ... extend only to entities of similar character," id. at 48, and
that the government maintained substantial discretion to classify which entities should
be deemed "of similar character." Id. at 48. Applying these principles to the facts in
Perry, the Court approved a school's determination that a rival teachers' union was not
"of similar character" to the union which had been designated the teachers' collective
bargaining representative. Id. at 55. Thus, Perry substantially constricted both the range
of property which would be classified as a limited public forum and the protection
against speech access restrictions on any such property. For examples of cases which,
under Perry's criteria, classify government property which has traditionally been accessible to speakers as nonpublic forums, see Gannett Satellite Information Network,
Inc. v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 745 F.2d 767, 773 (2d Cir. 1984) (public
areas of subway stations); ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 603 F. Supp. 869, 871 (D. Ariz.
1985) (intersection of two public streets). For a decision illustrating the difficulty of
showing an access restriction to be unreasenable as required by Perry, see Low Income
People Together, Inc. v. Manning, 615 F. Supp. 501, 518 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (requiring
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the Court stated that "[a]ccess to a nonpublic forum.

. .

can be

restricted as long as the restrictions are 'reasonable and [are]
not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view.' '43 Cornelius was the latest
in a series of recent Supreme Court decisions vesting the goverment with substantial discretion to define the speakers and
subjects that will be granted or denied access to government
property which is not open to the general public for speech
purposes. 44

Under the relatively constricted public forum doctrine reflected in these recent cases, a public school might well exclude
religion from a student forum without being held to violate
students' free speech rights. Consistent with the relatively expansive view of the government's discretion to restrict access
to its property which these cases espouse, a school could apparently manipulate its definition of appropriate subjects for a
"convincing evidence" of unreasonableness). See also Note, Public Forum Analysis
After Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association-A Conceptual Approach to Claims of First Amendment Access to Publicly Owned Property, 54
FORDHAM L. REv. 545, 550 (1986) [hereinafter FORDHAM Note]. ("[S]ince Perry, no
restriction of access to a nonpublic forum has ever been held unreasonable."),
41105 S. Ct. at 3448 (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 46). The Cornelius decision was
issued by a 4-3 vote, with Justices Marshall and Powell not participating. Accordingly,
the participation of these two Justices in future public forum cases could conceivably
restore some limitations upon governmental discretion to restrict speakers' access to
government property. Both Justices dissented from the Court's decision in Perry, 460
U.S. 37 (1983), which had also sanctioned broad governmental discretion to restrict
access to government property. See supra note 42.
44 In Cornelius, the Court held that an annual charitable fundraising drive conducted
in the federal workplace during working hours was not a limited public forum, although
for almost twenty years it had been open to any tax-exempt, nonprofit charitable
organization that was supported by public contributions and provided direct health and
welfare services to individuals. The Court therefore applied only minimal scrutiny to a
1982 Executive Order, No. 12,353, 3 C.F.R. 139 (1983), which for the first time excluded
from the fundraising drive "[a]gencies that seek to influence the outcomes of elections
or the determination of public policy through political activity or advocacy, lobbying,
or litigation on behalf of parties other than themselves." 105 S.Ct. at 3446. The Court
held that the exclusion of advocacy groups survived the low-level scrutiny it deemed
applicable, reasoning that the avoidance of controversy is a valid ground for restricting
speech in a nonpublic forum. Id. at 3453. Acknowledging that the purported concern to
avoid controversy may conceal a bias against particular viewpoints, the Court said that
on remand the excluded groups could attempt to show that their exclusion "was impermissibly motivated by a desire to suppress a particular point of view." Id. at 3455.
See also Perry, 460 U.S. 37 (although school mail facilities were open to union which
had been certified as teachers' exclusive bargaining representative, had previously been
open to rival union, and had periodically been open to civic and church organizations,
id. at 47-48, the Court held that these facilities did not constitute limited public forum,
and that school could bar rival union from them). According to the four Perrydissenters,
the selective exclusion sustained there constituted viewpoint discrimination which
should be prohibited even in a nonpublic forum. See id. at 65 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See also Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984);
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
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student forum to exclude, for example, all subjects deemed
"controversial," including religious, political, or philosophical
subjects. The school's assertion that such a subject matter definition was designed to avoid divisiveness and to provide a
harmonious atmosphere conducive to education would probably
be viewed as "reasonable" and not intended "merely" to sup45
press particular viewpoints.
The Justices who have dissented from recent Supreme Court
decisions eroding the public forum concept, 46 as well as First
Amendment scholars, 47 have decried these decisions as undermining fundamental free speech values. To the extent that these
criticisms are justified, the Equal Access Act could be viewed
as restoring the constitutionally correct understanding of the
limited public forum concept in the public school context. The
Act prohibits the government from fine-tuning its definition of
appropriate subjects for any public secondary school forum to
45 See Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3454.

Although the avoidance of controversy is not a valid ground for restricting

speech in a public forum, a nonpublic forum by definition is not dedicated to
general debate or the free exchange of ideas. The First Amendment does not
forbid a viewpoint-neutral exclusion of speakers who would disrupt a nonpublic
forum and hinder its effectiveness for its intended purpose.
Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 179-81 (under recent public forum decisions,
school might permissibly include political clubs in student forum, but exclude philosophical or religious clubs).
46 See, e.g., Perry, 460 U.S. at 57 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe Court disregards
the First Amendment's central proscription against censorship, in the form of viewpoint
discrimination, in any forum, public or nonpublic."). See also Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at
3455 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 3466 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Knight, 465 U.S.
at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (restriction of speech on policy matters is inconsistent
with First Amendment values which "guarantee an open marketplace for ideas-where
divergent points of view can freely compete for the attention of those in power").
41 See, e.g., Cass, FirstAmendment Access to Government Facilities,65 VA. L. REV.
1287, 1301 (1979) (reasoning in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights "stands the mandatory
access notice on its head. Instead of providing an additional brake on governmental
restriction of speech, [Lehman's] approach makes mandatory access a threshold test
for protection."); Farber & Nowak, supra note 36, at 1259, 1264 (public forum doctrine
"endangers judicial protection of first amendment values"; Perry was wrongly decided
because "Court failed to demand a noncensorial justification"); Werhan, The Supreme
Court's Public Forum Doctrine and the Return of Formalism, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 336,
342, 422-23 (1986) (under Court's recent public forum cases, "First Amendment interests
are lost in the formalistic maze of an outcome-determinative tiered analysis that focuses
primarily on the law of property"; under this analysis, Court has "allow[ed] plainly
viewpoint-based restrictions to stand"; this approach "appears calculated to enshrine
streets, parks, and sidewalks. . . as the only public fora"); FORDHAM Note, supra note
42, at 546-52 (1986) (Perryrevives previously repudiated treatment of speakers' access
to public property more as matter of property law than of free speech rights); Note, A
Unitary Approach to Claims of First Amendment Access to Publicly Owned Property,
35 STAN. L. REV. 121, 131, 133 (1982) (First Amendment values are undermined by
Court's recent public forum analyses, because of unsatisfactory criteria used to determine whether place is public forum, and because of the low level of scrutiny applied to
restrictions on speech in nontraditional forums).
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at least the same degree as the pre-Cornelius case law, and
invalidates subject matter restrictions which would probably be
48
acceptable under Cornelius.
3. Free Speech Clause Cases Concerning Public School
Students' Speech Rights
The Equal Access Act can fairly be viewed as counteracting
the Supreme Court's recent reductions in the protection accorded not only speech on public property generally, but also
in-school speech by public school students specifically. The
level of protection which the Act accords to student speech is
more consistent with the standard enunciated in the Supreme
Court's seminal student speech case, Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community School Dist.,4 9 than is the Court's latest
50
ruling on the issue, Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser.
Declaring that "[ijt can hardly be argued that students shed
their constitutional rights of freedom of speech or expression at
the schoolhouse gate," 51 the Court in Tinker ruled that schools
could not restrict students' expressive conduct merely on the
basis of general apprehensions. Instead, the Court repeatedly
emphasized that such restrictions would be permitted only if
based upon specific evidence demonstrating that the expressive
conduct would "materially and substantially interfere" with the
52
work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students.
Applying this standard to the facts in Tinker, the Court held that
the school had violated students' freedom of expression in suspending them for wearing armbands protesting the Vietnam War,
where the armbands had caused no actual disturbances. In addition, there was no specific evidence which might reasonably
have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of,
53
or material interference with, school activities.
In subsequent cases, the federal courts have consistently enforced Tinker's mandate that high school students' speech may
be restricted only on the basis of specific evidence establishing
that a particular harm necessitates such limitation. Accordingly,

"' See

infrd text accompanying notes 179-81, 258-66.

49393 U.S. 503 (1969).

10106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
5'Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505-06.
52 Id. at 509.
53Id. at 514.
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these cases have consistently rejected the presumption that high

school students are inherently
too immature to be entitled to
54

full free speech rights.

Indeed, applying the principles enunciated in Tinker and its
progeny, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court's ruling in Bethel that a high school had violated a stu-

dent's speech rights by suspending him for delivering a speech
containing sexual innuendoes at a student government assem-

bly. 55 In reversing Bethel, the Supreme Court paid lip service to
the standard it had articulated in Tinker.56 However, as noted
by the Ninth Circuit 57 and the dissenters from the Supreme
Court's majority opinion, 58 the evidence in Bethel did not satisfy
the Tinker standard: the record contained no evidence that any

particular student was offended or otherwise harmed by the
speech, let alone that the speech had caused or would be likely
to cause a substantial disruption of the school's educational
functions. Instead, the Supreme Court majority authorized the
school to curb student speech rights on the basis of mere spec-

ulation that the sexual innuendo might be offensive or insulting
to certain students in the audience, including younger students
59
and female students.
In effect, the Supreme Court in Bethel presumed that high

school students are too immature to be exposed to potentially
controversial, offensive or disruptive speech, and shifted the
burden of proof to the student speaker to establish that the
'4 See, e.g., Russo v. Central School Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973); Garvin v. Roseneau, 455 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1972); Riseman
v. School Comm., 439 F.2d 148 (1st Cir. 1971); Scoville v. Bd. of Educ., 425 F.2d 10
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970); Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381 (D.R.I.
1980); Wilson v. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Or. 1976); Dixon v. Beresh, 361 F.
Supp. 253 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
"5See Fraser v. Bethel School Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1359 (9th Cir. 1985)
("Just as in Tinker, the Bethel School District has failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that Fraser's use of sexual innuendo ... substantially disrupted or materially
interfered in any way with the educational process.").
m Bethel, 106 S. Ct. at 3163 (Court intimated that Tinker may be narrowly construed
to apply only to political speech, or at least that it may be viewed as not protecting
speech with sexual content).
57Fraser,755 F.2d at 1359-61.
11Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3168-69 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 3169 n.2 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
9 The majority opinion simply asserted, as if it were taking judicial notice of incontrovertible facts, that "[tihe pervasive sexual innuendo in Fraser's speech was plainly
offensive to . . . any mature person. By glorifying male sexuality ... the speech was
acutely insulting to teenage girl students." 106 S. Ct. at 3165. The majority opinion
further surmised that the speech "could well be seriously damaging" to the youngest
students in the audience, noting that they were "on the threshold of awareness of human
sexuality." Id.
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challenged speech would not meet the substantial disruption or
material interference standard. It also deferred extensively to
the discretion of school authorities to curb students' speech for
purposes of avoiding its speculative or presumed adverse
effects.
Bethel's weakened standards for judicial review of public
school limitations upon student speech could be invoked to
uphold denials of equal access for groups seeking to discuss
religion or other potentially controversial, and hence potentially
disruptive, subjects. 60 The Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause decisions concerning interrelationships between government and religion in the educational context have consistently
presumed that such interrelationships would lead to disruptive
effects such as divisiveness and alienation, without any specific
evidence that these effects were likely to occur.6 1 Indeed, much
like the dissenters in Bethel, Justices dissenting from these Establishment Clause decisions have charged the majority with
engaging in mere speculation about the adverse effects of the
challenged interrelationships. 62 In the context of the equal access controversy, the combined effect of Bethel and the educational Establishment Clause cases may well be to authorize
denials of access to student religious groups based upon little
more than the conjecture that some students might view an equal
access grant as the school's endorsement of religion.
The Supreme Court's recent decisions limiting free speech
rights in the context of both public forums in general and public
schools in particular have somewhat lessened the conflict between nonestablishment and free speech precedents posed by
pre-Cornelius and pre-Bethel equal access cases. Because these
recent free speech rulings increase school officials' discretion
to impose content-based restrictions on speech, the officials may
exercise such discretion to avoid the Establishment Clause problems that could result from in-school meetings of student religious groups. Nevertheless, if the Free Speech Clause were
60Because Fraser involved sexually explicit speech, it may well reflect the Court's
particular interest in sheltering minors from words or images relating to sexuality. See,
e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629 (1968). If so, Frasermay represent more of an exception to the Tinker standard
than a general erosion of it.
61 See

cases cited supra at note 29. See also infra note 102 and accompanying text.

See, e g., Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3244 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("The abstract theories explaining why on-premises instruction might possibly advance
religion dissolve in the face of experience in New York."). See also infra note 102.
6
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construed to grant student speech in public schools the full
measure of protection to which many judges and scholars con-

tend it is entitled, and which it received under Supreme Court
rulings until recently, then equal access issues would still entail
a sharp collision between nonestablishment and free speech
precedents. Putting aside the specific tenets of current constitutional doctrine, the equal access issue continues to reflect a
sharp collision between general values of nonestablishment and
free speech. 63 The following section discusses the cases which
have attempted to resolve this conflict.

B. Current ConstitutionalCase Law Concerning Equal
Access
1. The Supreme Court's Decision Concerning Equal Access in
the University Context
The Supreme Court's decision in Widmar v. Vincent 64 involved a public university which made its facilities generally
accessible to voluntary, student-initiated, nonreligious student
groups. The Court ruled that the university violated the Free
Speech Clause by not making these facilities equally accessible
to a voluntary, student-initiated, religious student group, which
sought to engage in prayer and worship.
Stressing the number and diversity of the student groups
which met at the university, 65 Widmar held that the university
had designated its campus as a limited public forum for students.
Based upon this finding, the Court concluded both that the Free
Speech Clause barred a content-based exclusion of the student
religious group, 66 and that the Establishment Clause permitted
granting equal access to this group, because no reasonable stu61As the district court observed in Bender:
On the one hand, but for the fact that the present dispute involved a high
school... Widmar clearly would have controlled. On the other hand, but for
the fact that the instant situation involved a purely student-initiated request to
use a forum created by the school, the "school prayer" cases may very well
have been dispositive.
563 F. Supp. at 699.
454 U.S. 263 (1981).

- Id. at 265, 274.
6Id. at 277.
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dent should perceive the university as endorsing the group's
religious message. 67
The Court suggested, however, that the Establishment Clause

analysis might be different in the context of a public high school
student forum, asserting that "[u]niversity students are, of
course, young adults. They are less impressionable than younger
students and should be able to appreciate that the University
policy is one of neutrality toward religion. '68 Although this statement implies that high schools might justifiably exclude student
religious groups, the Court did not make a definitive holding to
this effect. The Court did not state that all "younger students"
are so "impressionable" that they would be inherently incapable
of appreciating a school's neutral role under an equal access
policy. Therefore, the Supreme Court in Widmar did not resolve
under what circumstances, if any, high school student religious
groups should be granted equal access.
2. Courts of Appeals Decisions Concerning Equal Access in
the Secondary School Context
The four courts of appeals which have directly faced the
issue 69 have unanimously held that Establishment Clause values
67 The Widmar opinion reasoned that "an open forum in a public university does not
confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices" because an
equal access policy "'would no more commit the University ...to religious goals' than
it is 'now committed to the goals of the Students for a Democratic Society, the Young
Socialist Alliance,' or any other group eligible to use its facilities." Id. at 274 (quoting
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1317 (8th Cir. 1980)).
6sId. at 274 n.14.
69Another court of appeals decision, Nartowicz v. Clayton County School Dist., 736
F.2d 646 (lth Cir. 1984), also involved the propriety of a student religious group's
meeting on school premises, but the limited record in that case does not reveal whether
the school had an equal access policy. Because of the case's procedural posture, its
holding was quite narrow.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court order which preliminarily enjoined a
school district from permitting a junior high school student group called "Youth For
Christ" to meet on school premises, after school hours, under faculty supervision. The
Eleventh Circuit held that the district court had not abused its discretion in concluding
that the school's practice of permitting these meetings was likely to be found, after a
trial on the merits, to violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 649. In particular, the
court concluded that the religious meetings were likely to be found to have the impermissible effect of promoting religion, in light of the school district's history of announcing church-sponsored activities at school assemblies, on school bulletin boards, and
over school public address systems, and of allowing religious signs to be posted on
school property. Id. at 648-49. However, given the sparse record, the Eleventh Circuit
expressly noted that it could not make several factual determinations which would be
necessary to evaluate the propriety of permanent relief, including whether the school
permitted other student groups to meet on school premises. Id. at 649.
See also May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp., 787 F.2d 1105, 1118 (7th Cir.

1987]

Equal Access Act

135

require denial of equal access to high school student religious
groups. 70 However, these rulings were premised on differing
analyses.
The rationale of two decisions, the Second Circuit's holding
in Brandon v. Board of Educationof GuilderlandCentralSchool
District7' and the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Lubbock Civil Liberties
Union v. Lubbock Independent School District,72 are fully consistent with a categorical rule precluding concerted student re-

ligious expression in public schools. Although neither expressly
espoused such an absolute prohibition, both declared that "a
high school is not a 'public forum' where religious views can be
freely aired. 73 Thus, both courts apparently concluded that a
high school cannot create a forum for concerted student reli-

gious expression without engendering reasonable student perceptions that the school supports religion. These conclusions

followed from the courts' unsupported generalizations or presumptions that high school students are innately immature and
impressionable. 74 This reasoning seems inconsistent with pro-

tecting students' free speech rights concerning certain potentially controversial nonreligious subjects, exposure to which
could also adversely affect immature or impressionable
students .75

In contrast with Brandon and Lubbock, the other two equal
access decisions by courts of appeals, the Third Circuit's ruling
1986) (rejecting claim by teachers and other public elementary school employees that
the Free Speech Clause gave them the right to hold prayer meetings on school property
before the school day, because there was no evidence that school had created any free
speech forum). In dicta, the Seventh Circuit panel which issued the May opinion
indicated that it might have fewer Establishment Clause concerns regarding religious
meetings on school premises than did the other courts of appeals which have directly
ruled upon such issues. The court noted that
it]he strongest support for [the plaintiff teachers'] position is the fact that the
[school authorities] were fearful of violating the Establishment Clause. Their
concern, which may well have rested on an exaggerated view of the scope of
the Establishment Clause, led them to deny the use of school premises to two
religious groups, one of which, at least, was school-related. This refusal might
create interesting questions in a suit by such a group, modeled on the suit in
Widmzar, but that is not this suit ....
Id. at 1117.
70See supra note 5. But see May, 787 F.2d at 1117 (dicta), discussed supra at note
69.
71635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981).
72 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 680 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1155 (1983).
73Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1048; accordBrandon, 635 F.2d at 980.
74Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1046-47; Brandon, 635 F.2d at 978.
73See infra text accompanying notes 131-37.
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in Bender76 and the Tenth Circuit's holding in Bell v. Little Axe
Independent School Dist. No. 70,'77 employed ad hoc analyses.
Focusing upon the particular facts presented, both decisions
held that the equal access policies under review violated the
Establishment Clause. In Bender, the Third Circuit concluded
that the religious speech of a student Christian fellowship violated the Establishment Clause because it occurred during the
official school day, was part of a school-organized activity program, and took place in the presence of a school-approved
monitor. 78 In invalidating the student religious group meetings
in Bell, the Tenth Circuit stressed the following specific facts
presented by that case: the school was composed of students in
kindergarten through grade nine, so most students were in elementary grades;79 the religious group had been initiated by a
faculty member along with several students;80 teachers had participated in the meetings and arranged for outside speakers,
including a minister, to attend; 81 the meetings occurred after
school buses arrived at school, which was after teachers were
required to be on duty, and after students were legally subject
to the school's supervision and control; 82 students in the religious group were the only ones allowed inside the school building before the first class;83 and the student religious group's
meetings were announced through school publications and post84
ers on school walls.
In addition to stressing the specific facts involved in the cases
at bar, both the Bender and Bell opinions further indicated that,
because of certain inherent distinctions between universities and
schools, there was a greater risk that an equal access grant in a
secondary or elementary school would violate the Establishment
Clause. The courts asserted that, because of these differences,
high school students would more likely perceive such a grant as
governmental endorsement of religion. For example, the Third
Circuit in Bender emphasized the following distinctions: high
school students' relative immaturity; the more obvious presence
76 741

F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984).
-7766 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1985).
78741 F.2d at 560.
79766

F.2d at 1396 n.1, 1401 n.7.
90Id. at 1397.
81Id.

8ld. at n.4
81Id. at 1405.
84

Id. at 1397.
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that a religious group would "unavoidably" have owing to a high
school's more structured and controlled environment; the fact
that attendance for most high school students is compulsory
under state law; and the fact that high school students are
subject to constant supervision by, and follow the example of,
85
adult school authorities.
Nonetheless, unlike the Second and Fifth Circuits in Brandon
and Lubbock, both the Third and Tenth Circuits in Bender and
Bell stressed the important free speech rights of students in a
school forum, noting that while the particular facts in the respective cases tilted the constitutional balance of interests in
favor of Establishment Clause concerns, the outcome of such
balancing might differ in other situations.8 6 Therefore, the balancing approach followed by the Third and Tenth Circuits appears better calculated to promote both free speech and nonestablishment concerns than does the more nonestablishment
oriented, categorical approach of the Second and Fifth Circuits.
The anticipation that the Supreme Court would endorse one or
the other of these two basic approaches, which resulted from
its decision to review the Bender case, was frustrated by the
87
Court's ultimate disposition of Bender on procedural grounds.
3. The Supreme Court's Consideration of Equal Access in the
Secondary School Context
In an opinion joined by five Justices,88 the Supreme Court in
Bender vacated the Third Circuit's judgment and remanded the
case with instructions to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. 89 Neither the majority opinion nor Justice Marshall's separate concurrence expressed or intimated any views on the
merits of the controversy. The merits were discussed, however,
by the two dissenting opinions, one authored by Chief Justice

85

741 F.2d at 552.

86 Bender,

87Bender

741 F.2d at 561; Bell, 766 F.2d at 1407.

was not the first case presenting the high school equal access controversy
which the Court declined to review on the merits. It had previously denied certiorari in
both Brandon, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981), and Lubbock, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983).
91Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, Bender, 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986),
in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor joined. Justice Marshall
also filed a concurring opinion. 106 S. Ct. at 1335.
9This ruling was premised on the Court's conclusion that the sole party who had
appealed from the district court decision, an individual school board member and parent
of a student attending the school, did not have standing to appeal. Id. at 1333, 1335.
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Burger and joined by Justices White and Rehnquist, 90 and the
other written by Justice Powell. 91 The four dissenters agreed
with the majority that the Third Circuit's judgment should be
vacated, but they based their conclusion on substantive
grounds.
Both dissenting opinions agreed that Bender was controlled
by Widmar.92 Justice Powell, who had authored the Widmar
majority opinion, premised his Bender dissent entirely on the
Widmar precedent. He said that the only "arguable distinction"
between Widmar and Bender was the ages of the students involved, but he concluded that this "arguable distinction" did not
warrant different legal rulings in the two cases. 93 Although Justice Powell quoted Widmar's observation that university students are "less impressionable than younger students and should
be able to appreciate that the university's policy is one of neutrality toward religion," he nevertheless opined that, "particularly in this age of massive media information ...

the few years

difference in age between high school and college students" does
not "justif[y] departing from Widmar" in the high school setting. 94 In support of this conclusion, Justice Powell cited Supreme Court decisions recognizing that First Amendment rights
of free speech and association extend to high school students. 95
Chief Justice Burger's dissent appears to rest upon broader
grounds than the analogy between the Widmar and Bender cases
employed by Justice Powell. He characterized the Third Circuit's decision as holding that, "because an individual's discussion of religious beliefs may be confused by others as being that
of the state, both must be viewed as the same. '9 6 But, the
opinion reasoned, if individual discussion of religious belief is
to retain the protection it is intended to receive under the Free
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses, "utterly unproven, subjec90Id.
9' Id.
92Id.
93Id.
94Id.

at
at
at
at

1336.
1338.
1337 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 1338 (Powell, J., dissenting).
1339 (Powell, J., dissenting).

95Id. (citing Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 864 (1982); and Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 506-07 (1969)). Of course, just a few months after its Bender decision, the Supreme
Court issued its ruling in the Bethel case, which appeared to cut back the free speech
rights accorded to high school students in the earlier cases cited by Justice Powell. See

supra text accompanying notes 55-62. Regarding the inconsistencies between the positions espoused by the Bender dissenters in the Bender and Bethel cases, see infra
note 101.
96Bender, 106 S. Ct. at 1337 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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tive impressions of some hypothetical students should not be
allowed to transform individual expression of religious belief

into state advancemefnt of religion.

'97

Chief Justice Burger and the two other Justices who joined

his opinion would apparently not subject a school's grant of
equal access to any scrutiny under the Establishment Clause,

on the theory that granting access does not entail sufficient state
action to invoke constitutional limitations. 98 At the very least,
these Justices would impose as a threshold requirement, nec-

essary to trigger Establishment Clause scrutiny, the submission
of some objective evidence justifying students' perception that
an equal access grant manifested the school's endorsement of
religion. 99 Absent this type of evidence, they would apparently

deem irrelevant any indications that the equal access grant's
primary effect was to advance religion. 00
Chief Justice Burger's stringent evidentiary standard for challenging an equal access grant to a student religious group is
inconsistent not only with the Court's most recent pronouncements concerning student speech in Bethel, 1 1 but also with the
97 Id. (emphasis in original).

" See id. at 1337-38. It is difficult to understand how the Williamsport school's
voluntary creation of a student forum, in which groups met during the school day with
teacher monitors present, can fairly be characterized as "state inaction." See id. at
1338.
In any event, even assuming arguendo that the Williamsport school had taken no
action to initiate a student forum but had just passively permitted the student religious
group to meet, Establishment Clause scrutiny still should not be foreclosed. As recognized in Justice O'Connor's widely cited reformulation of the Lemon test in Lynch, see
supra note 28, the Establishment Clause may be violated when the government appears
to approve or disapprove religion, even if it has not actually done so. Under this
standard, a negative answer to Chief Justice Burger's "threshold question of whether
the challenged activity is conducted by the State or by individuals," Bender, 106 S. Ct.
at 1338, should not insulate such activity from judicial review. A school's passive
acquiescence in a student religious group's meeting could reasonably be perceived as
constituting endorsement, and would therefore violate the Establishment Clause even
though the school did not actually conduct the meeting.
99See Bender, 106 S. Ct. at 1337-38 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Even assuming arguendo the propriety of this threshold evidentiary requirement, Chief Justice Burger
does not explain why it could not be satisfied by evidence concerning those characteristics of public schools and their students which create risks that any group religious
expression on school property would be perceived as school endorsed. See infra text
accompanying notes 111-14.
"00See id. at 1338 ("That the 'primary effect' of state inaction might turn out to
advance the cause of organized religion has no bearing upon the threshold question of
whether the challenged activity is conducted by the State or by individuals.").
101The four dissenters in Bender, who joined the majority in Bethel, expressed substantially different attitudes concerning high school students' maturity and imposed
significantly different evidentiary standards, depending on whether or not the speech at
issue was religious. In Bethel, which did not involve religious speech, these Justices
referred to the high school student speaker as a "boy" and to the other students as
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Court's previous rulings concerning Establishment Clause problems caused by public school religious expression. The central
question involved in any Establishment Clause challenge to public school religious expression, whether reasonable students
would perceive it as conveying the school's approval or disapproval of religion, is not readily susceptible to "objective" proof.

Therefore, the reassignment of evidentiary burdens could have
a significant impact on the outcomes of actual controversies.
The Supreme Court's opinions concerning public school religious expression have not required specific objective evidence
that the challenged expressions would actually cause reasonable
student perceptions that the school endorses religion. Instead,
the Court has assumed or presumed that such perceptions would

arise from certain inherent characteristics of public schools and
their students: that students are required to be on school prem-

ises as a result of state compulsory education laws and that,
while on school premises, students are subject to at least a

modicum of school supervision, as a matter of state or local
law. 102
The effect of adopting the evidentiary burdens endorsed by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist in
"girls" or "children." 106 S. Ct. at 3165-66. In Bender, which did involve religious
speech, they argued that high school students should be accorded the same free speech
rights as college students, brushing aside arguments about different maturity levels. 106
S. Ct. at 1338 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 1339 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Moreover, the Bender dissenters castigated the Third Circuit's conclusion that granting equal access to a student religious group would cause reasonable student perceptions
that the school endorsed religion, charging that this finding rested on "utterly unproven,
subjective impressions of some hypothetical students." 106 S. Ct. at 1338 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). Yet in Bethel, these same Justices relied upon the same type of "evidence"
in concluding that the sexual innuendo contained in the student assembly speech would
offend other students. 106 S. Ct. at 3165. See supra text accompanying notes 57-59.
102See cases cited supra at note 29. Two recent Supreme Court decisions illustrate
the Court's relatively lenient evidentiary standards governing the finding of an Establishment Clause violation in cases "involving the sensitive relationship between government and religion in the education of our children." Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball,
105 S. Ct. 3216, 3222 (1985); see also Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985). The
Supreme Court in both cases invalidated certain governmental assistance programs,
under which public school employees taught secular subjects in parochial schools. The
Court in Grand Rapids feared that these teachers "knowingly or unwittingly tailor the
content of the course to fit the school's announced goals," causing a prohibited "indoctrinating effect." 105 S. Ct. at 3225-26. This potential Establishment Clause violation
persuaded the Court to strike down the programs, even though they had existed for
almost twenty years, and even though there was no evidence of even one incident of
the feared indoctrination throughout the entire period. Id. Expressly acknowledging this
lack of evidence, the Court dismissed it as "of little significance," and concluded that
"[t]he symbolic union of church and state inherent in [the challenged programs] threatens
to convey a message of state support for religion ..... Id. at 3230 (emphasis added).
See also supra note 62.
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Bender would apparently be to replace the current presumption-that any concerted student religious expression in public
schools causes Establishment Clause problems-with the presumption that any such expression is protected by the Free
Speech Clause. The effect of the position articulated in Burger's
Bender dissent is thus similar to that of the Equal Access Act,
which also confers presumptive access rights upon concerted
student religious expression. 0 3 In light of the compelling free
speech interests implicated in any public forum, including a high
school student forum, it is appropriate to grant more protection
to concerted student religious speech in such a context than
would be available under the traditional Establishment Clause
analysis, which would presume such speech to breach the required separation between government and religion. To go to
the other extreme, however, by presuming that free speech
concerns should prevail, would attribute insufficient weight to
the substantial countervailing Establishment Clause concerns
implicated by any concerted religious expression in the especially sensitive public school environment.
For the reasons explained in the following two Parts, either
absolute or presumptive rights of access for concerted student
religious speech would be inconsistent with Establishment
Clause principles. Instead, those principles, as well as Free
Speech Clause principles, require that any equal access dispute
be resolved on the basis of its particular facts and circumstances, with no absolute or presumptive rules in favor of either
countervailing set of constitutional concerns.
II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF A CASE-BY-CASE

RESOLUTION OF EQUAL ACCESS ISSUES

Three basic approaches are available for resolving any student
religious group's claim for equal access to a high school student
forum. The first is a general rule requiring schools to grant equal
access to any voluntary, student-initiated, student religious
group on free speech grounds. 10 4 The Equal Access Act essen103
See infra text accompanying notes 164-90; see also infra text following note 233.
104Any student religious group meeting that occurs on school property must be

voluntary and student-initiated. If any meeting, or any student's participation in a
meeting, were instigated by school officials or other adults, then the free speech rationale
for such a meeting would dissipate, because it would not reflect the students' expressive

and associational choices. The Establishment Clause dangers entailed in such a meeting
would concomitantly increase, because the adult role could create perceptions of government endorsement. See infra text accompanying note 184; see also infra text accompanying note 190.
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tially extends such per se permission, 10 5 and the four Supreme
Court Justices who dissented in Bender would apparently do
the same. 10 6 The second possible approach is a general rule
prohibiting schools from granting equal access to any student
religious group on Establishment Clause grounds. In Brandon
and Lubbock, the Second and Fifth Circuits each essentially
imposed such a per se prohibition.10 7
A third possible approach is an individualized determination,
based upon the facts and circumstances involved in any particular case, of whether a student religious group should be granted
equal access. Such an individualized analysis was employed by
the Third and Tenth Circuits in Bender and Bell, respectively. 0 8
This Part of the Article concludes that the case-by-case approach is the only one consistent with the applicable constitutional principles.
A. A CategoricalRule Requiring Schools to Grant Equal
Access Would Violate the Establishment Clause
No court which has considered the equal access issue has
advocated a per se rule authorizing concerted student religious
expression under an equal access policy.109 These cases all recognize the special establishment dangers posed by any religious
expression in high schools. Due to certain inherent characteristics of high schools, as contrasted with colleges, there is a
significant risk that any such expression, even in the context of
a student forum, could be perceived as conveying the school's
endorsement of religion. Judicial opinions have cited the follow105See infra text accompanying notes 164-90; text following note 233.
106 See

supra text accompanying notes 92-100.

107See

supra text accompanying notes 71-74.

109See supra text accompanying notes 76-86. The Supreme Court had also applied

an individual analysis to the university equal access issue in Widmnar. See supra text
accompanying notes 64-68.
109Even the two judges who have approved particular equal access grants to public
school student religious groups have stressed that their rulings were based upon the
particular facts and circumstances involved. See, Bender, 563 F. Supp. at 698 (Nealon,

C.J.); 741 F.2d at 569-70 (Adams, J., dissenting). Similarly, even with respect to the
public university equal access policy in Widmar, the Supreme Court emphasized that
its rulings were based upon the particular factual record, and should not be read as a
per se authorization of all student religious expression under every equal access policy.
454 U.S. at 274-75. But see supra text accompanying notes 92-103 (four dissenters from
Supreme Court's Bender decision would apparently endorse rule which at least pre-

sumptively authorized concerted student religious expression under equal access
policy).
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ing distinctions between colleges and high schools as particularly relevant: a high school serves more of an inculcative function than a college, which more closely resemble a marketplace
of ideas;" 0 most high school students are present in school by
virtue of state compulsory education laws;"' state laws generally require schools to exercise some supervision over students
while on school property;" 2 and high school students are generally less intellectually or emotionally mature, and more
impressionable, than college students.1 3 Accordingly, only a
close examination of the facts in any particular case can illuminate whether, as actually implemented, even a facially neutral
equal access policy has the nonneutral effect of implying that a
4
school supports religion."
B. A CategoricalRule ProhibitingSchools from Granting
Equal Access Would Violate the Free Speech Clause
The foregoing differences between high schools and colleges
warrant a stricter scrutiny of student religious speech in the
former than in the latter. However, these distinctions do not
absolutely preclude the creation of open student forums in high
schools, nor do they inevitably cause high school students to
perceive concerted religious expression in the school as endorsed by the school. Therefore, the above distinctions may not
afford even a rational justification for the per se exclusion of
concerted religious speech from a high school student forum. In
any event, these distictions do not afford the compelling justification traditionally required for content-based exclusions
of
5
forum.1
public
limited
or
forum
public
a
from
speech
110E.g., Bender, 741 F.2d at 552. "[H]igh school instruction is given in a structured

and controlled environment.

.

. [unlike] the open, free, and more fluid environment of

a college campus." Id.
III E.g., id.; Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1046; Brandon, 635 F.2d at 978.
112E.g., Bender, 741 F.2d at 552-53; Brandon, 635 F.2d at 979.
113E.g., Bender, 741 F.2d at 552; Brandon, 635 F.2d at 978.
14 Cf. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (1979):
By mandating a moment of silence, a State does not necessarily endorse any

activity that might occur during the period ....

Nonetheless, it is also possible

that a moment of silence statute.., as actually implemented could effectively
favor the child who prays over the child who does not. For example, the
message of endorsement would seem inescapable if the teacher exhorts children
to use the designated time to pray.

Id. at 2499 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
115See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
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The inculcative function of public high schools does not justify
an absolute prohibition of equal access. A public high school is
intended to serve dual, somewhat inconsistent roles: not only
as the transmitter of majoritarian views and values, but also as
the facilitator of students' independent thought, inquiry, and
discussion. 1 6 Both the Supreme Court" 7 and lower courts" 8
have expressly recognized the importance of the public high
school's role as a marketplace of ideas."

9

If a school were, or were perceived to be, serving as an
inculcator of student religious speech, it would transgress the
Establishment Clause. However, a school's designation of an
open student forum under an equal access policy epitomizes its
noninculcative or intellectual marketplace role. Reasonable students should appreciate that when a school functions as a marketplace of ideas, it does not necessarily endorse any ideas that
students might exchange in such a marketplace. 20 Any risk that
students would misperceive the school's neutral, noninculcative, nonsponsoring role under an equal access policy should be
countered through such measures as explanatory statements or
116See, e g., Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 868-69 (1982).
117 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
512 (1969) ("[P]ersonal intercommunication among the students ... is an important part
of the educational process."). See also Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967) ("The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas
which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection."') (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362,
372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)). Accord Wiemann v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Some Supreme Court decisions have referred to high schools and colleges interchangeably in discussing this essential intellectual marketplace function common to all
public educational institutions. See, e.g., Pico, 457 U.S. at 877; Tinker, 393 U.S. at
512-14 & n. 6; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
"8 See, e.g., Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 807 (2d Cir. 1971) ("A
public school is undoubtedly a 'marketplace of ideas.' Early involvement in social
comment and debate is a good method for future generations of adults to learn intelligent
involvement."). Accord James v. Bd. of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir. 1972); Cary
v. Bd. of Educ. of Adams-Arapahoe School Dist., 427 F. Supp. 945, 952-53 (D. Colo.
1977), aff'd, 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979) (while many Supreme Court statements
concerning importance of opportunity for independent inquiry in academic setting were
made in higher education context, "that does not destroy their importance in providing
a philosophical guidance" in secondary education context).
119Indeed, the plurality opinion in Pico suggested that public school students have a
constitutional right of access to a diversity of ideas. 457 U.S. at 866-68.
120See Cary, 427 F. Supp. at 953, affd, 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979) (in assessing
academic freedom issue, court should consider whether it arises in context where school
acts in inculcative role, or in context where student is part of "open, participatory
community").
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disclaimers.1 21 The wholesale exclusion of student religious

speech is not necessary to avert such risk.
Compulsory education and school supervision requirements

also do not warrant a per se prohibition of equal access. Even
assuming that the majority of high school students actually at-

tend school because of legal compulsion, 122 and even assuming
that all schools have some legal responsibility for students whenever they are on school premises,'123 it still does not follow that
students would inevitably regard their school as endorsing the
religious content of any concerted religious speech which occurs
on the school premises. The risk that these aspects of public
high schools could lead reasonable students to infer school support for religion could and should be readily countered through
121Various courts that have considered the tensions between free speech and nonestablishment values implicated by religious symbols on public property have relied upon
disclaimers to minimize Establishment Clause problems. See, e.g., McCreary v. Stone,
739 F.2d 716, 728 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd by an equally divided Court sub nom. Bd. of
Trustees v. McCreary, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985) (per curiam) (Establishment Clause does
not bar temporary location of privately owned nativity scene in public park: "[wie
believe that a proper disclaimer message [together with other factors] will ensure that
no reasonable person will draw an inference that the Village [of Scarsdale, New York]
supports any church, faith, or religion associated with the display of a creche during
the Christmas season").
In Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam), the court determined
that the temporary display of a creche in a public park would not violate the Establishment Clause if appropriate plaques indicated that the government did not sponsor the
creche. Id. at 67. The court emphasized that the plaques "should be designed for
maximum exposure and readability." Id. at 90 (Leventhal, J., concurring). See also
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 n.14 (university handbook contained disclaimer concerning
student organizations).
Of course, disclaimers will not always eliminate Establishment Clause violations. See,
e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (per curiam) (Establishment Clause
violated when copy of the Ten Commandments was required to be posted in every
public school classroom with disclaimer stating that the Ten Commandments constituted
the basis of secular legal system).
122In most states, school attendance ceases to be compulsory once a student has
attained the age of sixteen, which generally occurs in the tenth or eleventh grade.
Therefore, in a high school with grade levels nine or ten through twelve, most of the
students are no longer subject to compulsory education requirements. See Guggenheim
& Sussman, Age Under Which School is Compulsory, in THE RIGHTS OF YOUNG
PEOPLE, app. I, 306-07 (1985). Moreover, even students below the cut-off age level for
compulsory attendance probably attend school for reasons other than their legal obligation to do so. Cf. Note, Students' ConstitutionalRights on Public Campuses, 58 VA.
L. REv. 552, 554 (1972) (even university-level education has come to be widely viewed
as practical necessity).
123A random survey of the education statutes of several states indicates that many
impose on schools a duty to supervise students' conduct on school property only during
the school day. See, e.g., Lauricella v. Bd. of Educ., 52 A.D.2d 710, 381 N.Y.S.2d 566
(N.Y. App. Div. 1976). Schools generally have no duty to supervise students who
participate in voluntary extracurricular activities on school grounds after regular school
hours, unless the activity is inherently dangerous. See, e.g., Bush v. Smith, 154 Ind.
App. 382, 289 N.E.2d 800 (1972). See Strossen, supra note 22, at nn.137-38.
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reasonable, specific precautionary measures. Total exclusion of
student religious speech is not necessary for this purpose.
The distinguishing feature between high schools and colleges
that is most stressed by equal access decisions is high school
students' relative immaturity and impressionability. 124 This distinction also fails to warrant categorical denial of high school
equal access. The alleged difference between the general maturity levels of high school and college students would warrant
a blanket prohibition upon high school equal access only if all
high school students were inherently too immature and impressionable to be able to differentiate between a school's neutral
provision of an open forum and its partisan endorsement of
religious expression within that forum. Although the Supreme
Court stated in Widmar that "university students are less
impressionable than younger students," it did not reach the
question of whether high school students are so impressionable
that they would not "be able to appreciate that the [school's
equal access] policy is one of neutrality toward religion."'' 25 In
Brandon and Lubbock, however, the Second and Fifth Circuits
did reach this question, and both answered it in the affirmative. 12 6 Neither of these opinions refers to any evidence concerning the level of high school students' . impressionability.
Therefore, the courts apparently took judicial notice of the
"fact" that this level was sufficiently high to justify a total prohibition upon concerted student religious expression in public
127
schools.
Ironically, the idea that high school students inherently lack
the requisite intellectual or emotional maturity to understand
the government neutrality implicit in a student forum is logically
inconsistent with the conclusion that equal access must be denied to avoid an Establishment Clause violation. If students are
inherently bound to perceive a school's equal treatment of student religious groups as conveying its approval of religion, it
would logically follow that students would also be likely to
perceive the school's unequal treatment of student religious
groups as conveying its disapproval of religion. 128 The Estab124See

Bender, 741 F.2d at 552-55; Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1048; Brandon, 635 F.2d at

978.
2 454 U.S. at 275 n.14.
126See supra text accompanying

note 74.
See supra text accompanying notes 71-74.
128Judges who have viewed equal access grants to student religious groups as con127
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147

lishment Clause is violated just as much by a governmental act
or policy which appears to disapprove of religion as it is by one

which appears to approve of religion. 129 Therefore, even assuming for the sake of argument that the asserted presumptions
about high school students' relative immaturity were correct
(which is a debatable proposition), 30 they could not justify destitutionally mandated have expressed this opinion. See, e.g., Bender, 741 F.2d at 565
(Adams, J., dissenting); Lubbock, 680 F. 2d at 426.
This is not the same argument as the one made by proponents of state-mandated,
teacher-led prayer in public school classrooms: that the Court's invalidation of such
activities manifests hostility toward religion. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,

433-34 (1962). Students should be able to understand that the Establishment Clause, as
well as the Free Exercise Clause, prohibits the government from sponsoring any reli-

gious activity in the public school classroom. This does not mean, however, that students
should be able to understand that these constitutional guarantees prohibit students from
voluntarily meeting to engage in religious expression at times and places when and
where other students voluntarily meet to engage in other types of expression. If students
are in fact able to understand that the exclusion of religious groups would not manifest
the school's hostility toward religion, then they should also be able to understand that
the inclusion of religious groups would not manifest the school's endorsement of religion.
129 See supra note 5.
110See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245 n.3 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("There is
substantial agreement among child psychologists and sociologists that the intellectual
and moral maturity of the 14-year-old approaches that of the adult").
Contrary to the unsubstantiated assertions in some equal access decisions that high
school students are less mature than college students, some experts in adolescent
psychology believe that many high school students are less emotionally vulnerable or
susceptible to indoctrination than many college students. See Note, The Constitutional
Dimensions of Student-InitiatedReligious Activity in Public High Schools, 92 YALE
L.J. 499, 507-09 (1983). Based upon research in adolescent psychology, this Note argues
that
[h]igh school may in fact be a time when the distinction between tolerance
based on mutual respect and explicit approval of student expression is particularly clear, even more clear, perhaps, than in later stages of life. Thus, not
only is the high school student able to make such a distinction, he is also likely
to do so.
Id. at 509.
Experts in adolescent psychology have also opined that college students, at least in
the early years of college, are in a "late adolescent" stage, when they are extremely
impressionable and hence vulnerable to indirect coercion concerning religious beliefs.
See, e.g., White, Problems and Characteristicsof College Students, in ADOLESCENCE,
Vol. XV (No. 57), 23, 28 (1980). This analysis is supported by evidence that the typical
convert to a nontraditional religion or "cult" is between the ages of eighteen and twentyfive, and a college student. C. STONER & J. PARKE, ALL GOD'S CHILDREN 68, 76 (1977);

Schwarz & Kenslow, Religious Cults, the Individualand the Family, 5 J. OF MARITAL
AND FAMILY THERAPY, 15, 16 (1979).
In contrast with the circuit court equal access decisions which have taken judicial
notice of high school students' alleged immaturity, some other decisions have taken
judicial notice of these students' maturity and sophistication. See, e.g., Seyfried v.
Walton, 668 F.2d 214, 219-20 (3d Cir. 1981) (Rosenn, J., concurring) (taking judicial
notice of progressively higher levels of students' intellectual and emotional development
in later secondary school grades); Russo v. Central School Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623,
633 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973) (finding tenth graders sufficiently
mature that teacher's refusal to lead flag salute would not have "destructive effect"
upon them, court asserted that such students "are approaching an age when they form
their own judgments"); Wilson v. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358, 1368 (D. Or. 1976)
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nial of equal access; such presumptions or assumptions would
dictate the conclusion that the denial of equal access would only
substitute one type of Establishment Clause violation for
another. 131
An additional fundamental flaw in these unfounded presumptions or assumptions about high school students' immaturity or
impressionability is that they are inconsistent with students' free
speech rights. Mere assumptions or presumptions, as opposed

to actual evidence, do not justify restricting student speech.'
As noted by the Supreme Court Justices who dissented in
Bender, students' free speech rights would not be meaningful if
they could be displaced by the "utterly unproven, subjective
impressions of some hypothetical students.' 1 33 Following
Tinker, the federal courts have closely confined school authorities' discretion to curtail students' exposure to various nonreligious ideas or opinions which such authorities do not support. 134 Moreover, the courts have done so even while expressly

acknowledging that school authorities have a legitimate interest
in avoiding the impression that they endorse such ideas or opin("[Tioday's high school students are surprisingly sophisticated, intelligent, and discerning. They are far from easy prey for even the most forcefully expressed, cogent, and
persuasive words.").
"I A school should be able to avoid either type of violation through the adoption of
measures less drastic than either an outright grant of access applicable on the same
terms to all other student groups, or an outright denial of access. See infra notes 150
& 158.
132
See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 737 ("[U]ndifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance
is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression."); id. at 738 ("[Olur
independent examination of the record fails to yield evidence that the school authorities
had reason to anticipate that the wearing of the armbands would substantially interfere
with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students."). As discussed
supra at text accompanying notes 55-62, the Court's recent Bethel decision appeared
to depart from a strict application of this Tinker standard, although the Court acknowledged Tinker's continuing authoritativenss. It is not clear to what extent Bethel marks
a generalized diminution of the protection accorded to students' speech rights, and to
what extent it reflects the Court's particular willingness to insulate minors from sexually
explicit speech of the type involved in that case. See supra note 60.
131 106 S. Ct. at 1337 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
234 Tinker itself expressly declared that students "may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially approved." 393 U.S. at 511. Accord Shanley
v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970-72 (5th Cir. 1972) (free speech
rights of high school seniors violated when school board suspended them for distributing
"underground" newspaper advocating review of marijuana laws and offering birth control information); Gambino v. Fairfax City School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731, 736-37 (E.D.
Va.) (enjoining school board from prohibiting publication of article entitled "Sexually
Active Students Fail to Use Contraception" in school newspaper), aff'd per curian,
564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164, 1165-66 (E.D.N.Y.
1974) (students' free speech rights would be violated if high school officials restrained
distribution of school newspaper containing information about birth control), aff'd, 515
F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975).
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ions. 135 Instead, directly contrary to the operative presumptions
in Brandon and Lubbock, these cases presume that high school
students are capable of distinguishing a school's neutral provision of access to a spectrum of ideas and opinions from its
136
partisan endorsement of any particular idea or opinion.
This Article does not aim to prove that the average high school
student is sufficiently mature to appreciate the neutrality of a
public forum. Rather, it seeks to emphasize that the decisions
which have endorsed absolute prohibitions upon equal access
do not cite any evidence proving that the average high school
student lacks the requisite maturity. The Article further seeks
to underscore that, under constitutional authorities, mere presumptions or assumptions about high school students' immaturity cannot justify denying their free speech rights, or making
those rights more limited than the corresponding rights of college students. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that, in
the view of some adolescent psychology experts, many high
school students are less emotionally vulnerable or susceptible
to indoctrination than many college students. 37
III. PROPOSED ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR CASE-BY-CASE

RESOLUTION OF EQUAL ACCESS ISSUES

The preceding Part of this Article suggests two basic considerations that must both be taken into account in resolving any
equal access issue consistently with both nonestablishment and
free speech concerns. First, a public high school can, in theory,
create a neutral student forum in which content-based restrictions on speech should be strictly limited. Second, due to certain
characteristics which generally distinguish high schools from
colleges and universities, there is a significant risk that any
concerted religious speech in a high school could generate a
115
See, e.g., Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 1981) ("A school has an
important interest in avoiding the impression that it has endorsed a viewpoint at variance
with its educational program"); Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1049 (2d Cir.
1979).
236For example, in James v. Bd. of Educ., 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1042 (1972), the Second Circuit expressly relied on the high school students' ability
to distinguish between the official views of the school board and the personal opinions
of a teacher as a basis for upholding the teacher's right to wear an armband protesting
the Vietnam War. The court noted that "[iut does not appear that any student believed
the armband to be anything more than a benign symbolic expression of the teacher's
personal political views." 461 F.2d at 574.
117See supra note 129.
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reasonable perception that the school endorses religion, even
when the school has created a neutral student forum.
From the foregoing pair of basic considerations, it follows
that concerted student religious speech should be allowed on
high school premises if and only if two general criteria are both
met: (1) the school has created a neutral, open student forum;
and (2) reasonable students do not infer that the school endorses
religion. 3 8 This Part of the Article proposes an analytical fra'mework for determining whether these two general, constitutionally mandated prerequisites for an equal access grant have been
met in any particular case. 139
In sum, a high school would be required to grant equal access
to a student religious group if and only if certain showings could
be made that were designed to assure compliance with the standards of both the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses. Once
such showings were made, a presumption would arise that the
equal access grant would be proper. However, this presumption
could be rebutted by specific evidence that reasonable students
would perceive the equal access grant as manifesting school
support for religion. Following any such rebuttal, a school would
be permitted to impose a special limitation upon the student
religious group meetings, including the outright prohibition of
such meetings, only if any such limitation were demonstrated
to be the least drastic means available to counter reasonable
inferences that the school endorsed religion.

"I Although the school should make efforts to ensure that every student understands
the neutrality of its open student forum, it should not restrict or exclude student religious
groups merely because some students unreasonably misperceive equal access as reflect-

ing school endorsement of religion. See Citizens Concerned For Separation of Church
and State v. City & County of Denver, 526 F. Supp. 1310, 1315 (D. Colo. 1981) (court

permits nativity scene displayed on public property despite evidence that "most sensitive
or fastidious citizens" perceive it as conveying government's endorsement of religion).
Cf. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (test that "judg[es] obscenity by the
effect of isolated passages upon the most susceptible persons ... must be rejected as
unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of speech and press").
" The proposed framework charts an intermediate course between the evidentiary
standards reflected in Free Speech Clause and Establishment Clause precedents, re-

spectively. Under traditional Free Speech Clause doctrine, a presumptive right of access

for student religious speech would arise upon the showing of a student forum which is
open to a sufficiently broad range of subjects. Following such a showing, the equal
access opponent would bear the heavy burden of demonstrating that equal access would
violate the Establishment Clause and that no less drastic alternative than denial of
access could avert the violation. In contrast, under settled Establishment Clause doctrine, the equal access proponent would bear the heavy burden of disproving the
presumptive Establishment Clause dangers deemed inherent in any public school religious expression. See Strossen, supra note 22, at 175-79.
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The evaluation of whether any particular equal access grant
to a student religious group is required by the Free Speech

Clause or prohibited by the Establishment Clause cannot be
completely confined to any codified set of criteria. Part III of

this Article articulates factors and standards which should substantially guide the consideration of the ultimate constitutional

questions, but the specified factors and standards cannot definitively resolve those questions. 140 The proposed standards represent an intermediate level of particularity, between the impre-

cise ultimate tests imposed by the Free Speech Clause and
Establishment Clause (whether the school has created a forum

for student speech and whether reasonable students would infer
that it endorses religion) and a detailed code of particular criteria
(whether a school has taken certain specific steps, which are
deemed both necessary and sufficient for resolving the two underlying constitutional questions). In this respect, the proposed

analytical framework departs both from the less structured approaches of the two circuit courts which have resolved equal

access disputes on an individualized basis, and from the more
rigid approach embodied in the Equal Access Act.141 It is prob-

ably impossible to draw a precise route for assuring compliance
with both free speech and Establishment Clause concerns in all
equal access controversies. Nevertheless, it is submitted that
the proposed intermediate-level approach charts a prudent midway course between the Scylla of vagueness (resulting from a
140 See Werhan, supra note 47, at 423-24 (advocates evaluation of claims of access to
public property according to whether expression is compatible with normal activity of
particular place at particular time; acknowledging that such an open-ended test is difficult
for courts to administer and somewhat unpredictable, the author concludes that these
costs are worth paying because reasons underlying decisions would be consistent with
First Amendment values and fully articulated).
14, The proposed evidentiary approach is more structured than that followed by the
two circuit courts, because it focuses largely upon specifically articulated criteria. See
supra note 14 (describing Third Circuit's uniquely open-ended balancing test). However,
the proposed approach is simultaneously more flexible than the one reflected in the
Equal Access Act, see infra note 164, since it recognizes that the process of answering
the ultimate constitutional questions implicated in any equal access dispute can be
guided by, but not completely confined to, a set of specified criteria.
For a discussion of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of resolving disputes about free speech access to government property pursuant to a case-by-case
balancing process, or pursuant to fixed rules, see Cass, supra note 47, at 1317. Like
this Article, the Cass piece proposes an intermediate approach; it articulates factors for
evaluating each case which "do not eliminate altogether the need for balancing but do
generalize some aspects of the balance." Id. at 1325. See also Farber & Nowak, supra
note 36, at 1240-42 (for resolving claims concerning speech access to public property,
advocates "focused balancing," which is hybrid between categorical approach and ad
hoc balancing); supra text accompanying notes 64-68; see also supra text accompanying
notes 76-86.
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test which, in its insufficient specificity, provides inadequate

guidance and predictability) and the Charybdis of overbreadth
(resulting from a test which, in its excessive specificity, either

proscribes too much expression that would be protected by the
Free Speech Clause or permits too much that would violate the
142
Establishment Clause).

A. Showing Required to Establish Prima Facie Equal Access
Right for Student Religious Speech
1. There Must Be an Open Student Forum
A public high school is not a traditional public forum. Therefore, a student religious group would have no protected access
right to public school property unless it could demonstrate that
the school had created a student forum by opening its facilities
to student expression and association. 43 To demonstrate that
the school had created a forum which is sufficiently open to
trigger equal access rights for student religious groups, the equal
access proponent should be required to make two essential

showings: (1) that the forum was not created to promote religion; and (2) that any subject matter parameters are sufficiently
broad to include, but not to single out, religion.
The first required showing mirrors the fundamental tenet that,
to survive Establishment Clause scrutiny, a government policy

142Cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 1211 at 630-31 ("[T]he dilemma of overbreadth
versus vagueness in the context of the fair trial problem is insoluble [because of]...
the inherently speculative character of any prediction ... that a particular message will
prevent the fair trial of a case."). The dilemma of overbreadth versus vagueness in the
context of the equal access problem is also insoluble for an equivalent reason-namely,
the inherently speculative character of any prediction that a particular religious student
group meeting will be reasonably viewed as conveying the school's support of religion.
See also id. at 714-16 (discussing general necessity of trading off overbreadth for
vagueness whenever limitations upon First Amendment rights cannot be categorically
defined, which occurs in any situation where First Amendment limitation aims to prevent
harm from occurring rather than to redress consummated harm).
143See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981). If a student religious group
sought to meet at school independently of any open student forum, not only would it
have no right of access under the Free Speech Clause, but also its meeting would almost
certainly violate the Establishment Clause. As the Supreme Court stressed in Widmar,
only the presence of numerous, diverse nonreligious groups could eliminate the perception that the school promoted religion which would otherwise have resulted from the
student religious group's campus meetings. Id. at 265, 274, 277.
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must have a clear secular purpose.144 The second required show-

ing derives from both Free Speech Clause and Establishment
Clause doctrines. Under the Free Speech Clause, no speaker or
group could claim a right of equal access to a limited public
forum unless the proposed speech fit within permissible subject
matter limitations upon that forum. 145 Under the Establishment
Clause, religion may be included within a broad class which
receive public benefits,' 146 but it may not be singled out for such
grants. 147 If some secular groups were excluded from the forum,
the inclusion of religious groups might constitute a special benefit to religion in contravention of the Establishment Clause.
Therefore, a school which barred the meetings of a student
political or philosophical group, for example, could have diffi144See supra note 28. The importance of this requirement in the particular context of
public school religious expression is highlighted by the Supreme Court's most recent
decision concerning such expression, Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985). The
Court struck down an Alabama statute that mandated a moment of silence in public
schools, ostensibly for purposes of meditation, prayer, or any other quiet activity chosen
by each individual student. In light of the statute's background, however, the Court
concluded that its actual purpose was to promote prayer. Id. at 2491. Likewise, a public
school forum that is purportedly created to promote student free speech and association
but is, in reality, a subterfuge for school-promoted religion would violate the Establishment Clause and not give rise to any free speech rights on the part of student religious
groups.
141See, e.g., City of Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Public Employment
Relations Comm'n., 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (school board meeting is limited public forum
for speech concerning school board business only).
146See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (sustaining tax exemptions
for religious institutions, because within broad class of nonprofit institutions receiving
this tax benefit). Accord Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (in upholding plan
allowing parents to claim state tax deduction for children's educational expenses, Court
stressed breadth of tax benefits available to all parents, including those with children in
public and private nonsectarian schools).
For a discussion of religion as included in a broad class for equal access purposes,
see Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 (referring to university's grant of access to over 100 student
groups, Court stated that "[t]he provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of groups
is an important index of secular effect"). See also Country Hills Christian Church v.
Unified School Dist., 560 F. Supp. 1207 (D. Kan. 1983). Where an elementary school
building was made available to community groups during nonschool hours, the school
district violated the Free Speech Clause by denying equal access to church for worship
services. Such equal access would not violate Establishment Clause, for "[i]t is possible
that religion and certain groups may benefit from access to School District facilities,
but this is not the direct effect of the equal access policy; it is merely an incidental
effect .... Religious groups share benefits with all other community groups. If religious
groups benefit, it is in spite of, rather than because of, their religious character." Id. at
1218.
,47Justice Brennan drew this distinction in his concurring opinion in School Dist. of
Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Although he suggested that "hostility,
not neutrality, would characterize ... the denial of the temporary use of an empty
public building to a congregation whose place of worship has been destroyed by fire or
flood," id. at 299, he also noted that "[a] different problem may be presented with
respect to the regular use of public school property for religious activities." Id. at 298
n.74.
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culty contending that it had created a sufficiently
open forum to
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2. The School Must Impose Content-Neutral Restrictions to
Minimize Establishment Risks
Because of the establishment dangers inherent in concerted
religious expression in the public schools, as well as the difficulty of ascertaining whether such expression in fact violates
the Establishment Clause, a school's duty under the Establishment Clause should be construed to go beyond merely avoiding
clear violations. Instead, as courts have recognized, the school's
duty should be viewed as the broader one of taking reasonably
available, constitutionally permissible steps to minimize the risk
of an Establishment Clause violation. 149 Accordingly, in addition
to demonstrating the existence of an open student forum, the
equal access proponent should also be required to show that
the school has taken such steps.
In particular, the equal access proponent should show that

the school has imposed certain content-neutral time, place, and
manner regulations upon student group meetings.150 The meet148See

supra text accompanying notes 37-45.
e.g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3226-27 (1985). See
also Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist. No. 70, 766 F.2d 1391, 1407 (10th Cir. 1985)
("[W]e believe that religious activity in the public schools., requires stricter separation
than does a university campus or a public square."). Some courts have suggested that
schools' interests in minimizing risks of Establishment Clause violations could even
justify infringing free speech rights. For example, in Bender, the Third Circuit squarely
held that the school's denial of equal access would violate the students' free speech
rights, 741 F.2d at 550, but it nonetheless ordered the school to deny equal access to
avoid an Establishment Clause violation. Id. at 560-61. In contrast, the recommended
measures are fully consistent with free speech principles. See infra note 150. Cf. Weber
v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 230 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 443 U.S. 193 (1978) (to enable employers and unions to avoid walking
"tightrope" between potential liability for discrimination against minorities and discrimination against white majority, affirmative action plan adopted in collective bargaining
agreement should be upheld if it is reasonable remedy for "arguable violation" of Title
VII).
1o The recommended regulations constitute less drastic alternatives to either an-unqualified grant of access to a student religious group, with its attendant establishment
dangers, or an outright denial of access, with its attendant free speech and establishment
dangers. See infra note 158. These content-neutral regulations should significantly reduce the risk of an Establishment Clause violation without abridging students' free
speech rights. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288
(1984):
Expression ... is subject to reasonable time, place and manner restrictions
..provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant govern149See,
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155

ings should take place at times clearly separated from the compulsory attendance period;' 5 the role of any adult supervisor

should be as limited as permissible under applicable law 152 and
should under no circumstances include participation in student

group meetings; and the school should distribute information to
students explaining the school's neutral role under an equal
access policy in general, and disclaiming any approval or disapproval of religion in particular.' 53

B. Showing Required to Overcome Prima Facie Equal Access

Right for Student Religious Speech
The proposed requirements for a prima facie showing that
student religious speech should have equal access to public high
schools can reduce, but cannot completely eliminate, the possibility that an equal access grant would violate the Establishment Clause. 154 Accordingly, under the proposed evidentiary
approach, once an equal access proponent had established a

mental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.
Id. at 293 (citations omitted).
The proposed measures easily satisfy this standard. They are content-neutral because
they apply to all student groups, regardless of the subject matter of their speech. They
are narrowly tailored to serve the compelling governmental interest in complying with
both the Establishment Clause and the Free Speech Clause. Finally, they leave open
ample alternative channels for student group communication. All three measures should,
in fact, enhance students' expressive rights by de-emphasizing the school's traditional
inculcative role.
For a fuller discussion of the rationales for treating the proposed regulations as
essential prerequisites for equal access grants to student religious groups, see Strossen,
supra note 22, at nn.130-35 & accompanying text.
"I See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS, EQUAL ACCESS: INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES 17 (1984) (reporting results of survey conducted in summer of 1984) [hereinafter AASA GUIDELINES] (seventy-eight
percent of responding school districts already require noncurriculum related student
groups to meet either before or after school).
,52See supra note 122.

t53Regarding the use of disclaimers and other explanatory statements, see supra note
120. For a more expansive discussion of all the proposed content-neutral regulations,
see Strossen, supra note 22, at nn.136-40 & accompanying text.
1'4 As Justice O'Connor recognized in her Wallace concurrence, 105 S. Ct. at 2496,
even a neutral policy can have the impermissible effect of promoting religion, depending
upon its implementation. See supra note 114.

156
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prima facie claim, the burden would shift to the opponent to

demonstrate that access should be restricted or denied.155
In accordance with general public forum doctrine, once a
student religious group has established a prima facie right of
access to a public high school forum, no special restrictions
should be imposed upon the group unless such restrictions were
demonstrated to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest. 156 The specific compelling interest which is implicated in the equal access context is the interest in avoiding
an Establishment Clause violation. 157 Consequently, so limitations should be imposed upon any religious student group meetings unless these limitations were shown to be the least drastic
measures necessary to avert an Establishment Clause violation. 58 Likewise, the student religious group should not be del' For another proposed framework for evaluating constitutionally permissible access
restrictions on speech in public schools, which also recognizes that compelling free
speech concerns warrant access but that such concerns can be overcome by countervailing considerations, see Cass, supra note 47, at 1342-44. Although Cass does not
expressly discuss student religious speech, the application to such speech of factors he
identifies as pertinent to school access disputes in general should lead to granting equal
access in some cases and denying it in others. On the pro-access side, Cass notes that
because students have limited alternative forums for speech, courts should require
school officials to make "substantial efforts to harmonize speech and other interests,"
and that "schools easily could allow ...

student speech ...

during non-class hours."

Id. at 1344. On the nonaccess side, he cautions that courts "should be especially leery
of commanding officials to allow speech that might be disruptive in ... some schools,
where a relatively volatile population is involved." Id.
156 See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
157In Widmar the Supreme Court concluded that the Establishment Clause did not
bar the university from granting equal access to a student religious group. Consequently,
it did not "reach the question that would arise if State accommodation of ... free
speech rights should, in a particular case, conflict with the prohibitions of the Establishment Clause." 454 U.S. at 273 & n.13. However, the Court did recognize that the
university's "interest ... in complying with its constitutional obligations [under the
Establishment Clause and the State constitutional counterpart] may be characterized as
compelling." Id. at 271.
In McCreary v. Stone, 575 F. Supp. 1133 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), the court held that the
avoidance of an Establishment Clause violation was a sufficiently compelling state
interest to justify content-based exclusion of speech from a public forum. Accord May
v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp., 615 F. Supp. 761, 766 (S.D. Ind. 1985), aff'd,
787 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir. 1986) (school's interest in avoiding Establishment Clause violation that might result from permitting teachers to hold religious meetings at school,
before school day, is sufficiently compelling to override countervailing constitutional
interests asserted by teachers, including free association, equal protection, and free
exercise of religion).
158 Establishment Clause problems which might result from student religious groups
being granted access on the same terms as other student groups could perhaps be
avoided through the following types of alternative measures, which are less drastic than
either an unqualified grant or an outright denial of access: student religious groups could
be barred from using any or all school media to publicize their meetings; student religious
group members could be "released" from school in order to meet at other nearby
locations; a school could limit the length or frequency of student religious group meet-
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nied access altogether unless the equal access opponent could
prove that less drastic alternative measures would not suffice to
prevent an Establishment Clause violation.
An equal access opponent could potentially meet the burden
of proof necessary to overcome an access right by producing

some evidence of the following types: testimony of individual
students that they perceive the school to be sponsoring religion;

opinion testimony by experts in adolescent psychology or education that, under the circumstances, a reasonable student
would infer school support for religion; a survey of students
demonstrating that some statistically significant portion perceived the school to be endorsing religion;159 and evidence concerning objective factors which could support a conclusion that
a hypothetical "reasonable student" would infer school endorsement of religion.1 60 Evidence about objective factors which
might support the foregoing conclusion could include, for example, evidence that the forum is not actually utilized by numerous, diverse student groups, or that the forum is used pre161
dominantly by one or more religious groups.
ings; such meetings could be confined to areas of the school that are not normally used
for regular classroom instruction; and such meetings could be scheduled for evenings
or weekends. See Strossen, supra note 22, at nn. 149-52.
In addition to assisting a school in avoiding both an abridgement of students' free
speech rights and a violation of the Establishment Clause by supporting religion (or
reasonably appearing to do so), the foregoing measures should also assist a school in
avoiding the Establishment Clause violation that could result from its disapproving of
religion (or reasonably appearing to do so). See supra note 5, text accompanying notes
127-30.
259 See Strossen, supra note 22, at nn.146-48.
,60This could include evidence concerning any steps the school may take to promote
its noninculcative role, the particular options the school has in fulfilling its supervisory
obligations, and the general intellectual and emotional levels of the school's student
body. See generally Trachtman v. Anker, 426 F. Supp. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd, 563
F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977). The district court in Trachtnan rejected school authorities'
assertion that a student-authored questionnaire concerning eleventh and twelfth grade
high school students' sexual attitudes would cause sufficient psychological harm to
justify prohibiting its distribution. The district court relied upon the following factors
pertaining to the school: that it was located in New York City, where students were
confronted with much information about sexuality; that it taught sex education courses;
and that it was for intellectually gifted students who were "likely to respond ... with
a higher degree of maturity than other students." Id. at 202 & n.3.
161Evidence concerning both the forum's actual utilization and the relative predominance of religious groups was central to the Supreme Court's analysis in Widmar. See,
e.g., 454 U.S. at 275 ("At least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious groups
will dominate [the university's] open forum.., the advancement of religion would not
be the forum's 'primary effect."').
The absence of the suggested actual utilization and nonpredominance factors would
neither disprove the existence of a limited public forum nor prove the existence of an
Establishment Clause violation. So long as the school property was in fact open and
available as a matter of policy, a limited public forum should be found to exist, even if
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF EQUAL ACCESS ACT'S
STANDARDS

The Equal Access Act contains two general provisions that
might be invoked to bring it into line with prevailing constitutional doctrines. Initially, the Act provides that it should not be

construed as authorizing the United States or any state or political subdivision "to sanction meetings that are otherwise unlawful" or "to abridge the constitutional rights of any person."' 62
It also contains a "savings clause" which provides that if any
provision of the Act, or its application in any situation, is judicially invalidated, the Act's remaining provisions, and its applications in other situations, will not be affected. 63 In light of
these general provisions, the Act could potentially be given
limiting constructions that would save it from invalidation, notwithstanding constitutional flaws in certain specific provisions.
This Article, however, focuses on the constitutional problems
presented by the Act's specific provisions.
A. The Act's Standards

The Equal Access Act' 64 applies to any public secnumerous, diverse student groups did not actually utilize it. See McCreary, 739 F.2d at
722 (in concluding that park constituted public forum, court stressed park's availability
for free speech purposes; that park had not actually been utilized by numerous, diverse
speakers was irrelevant). Likewise, so long as the school is neither supporting any
student religious group nor perceived by the students as doing so, the student religious
group meetings would not violate the Establishment Clause, even if such meetings did
predominate. See Strossen, supra note 22, at n.142.
16220 U.S.C. §§ 4072 (d)(5), (d)(7)(Supp. 1985).
163Id. § 4073. There is only sparse legislative history concerning these "safety valve"
provisions. The "otherwise unlawful" provision was discussed briefly in the floor debates, with the implication that it would apply to some state laws forbidding homosexual
conduct. See 130 CONG. REC. S8343 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Hatfield). The "constitutional rights" provision was hardly mentioned at all.
164The Equal Access Act, Pub. L. No. 98-377, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws, 98 Stat. 1302 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1984)), reads as follows:
SHORT TITLE
SEC. 801. This title may be cited as "The Equal Access Act."
DENIAL OF EQUAL ACCESS PROHIBITED
SEC. 802 (a) It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which
receives Federal financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to
deny equal access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students
who wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open forum on the basis of
the religious, political, philosophical or other content of the speech at such
meetings.
(b) A public secondary school has a limited open forum whenever such
school grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more noncurriculum
related student groups to meet on school premises during noninstructional time.
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(c) Schools shall be deemed to offer a fair opportunity to students who wish
to conduct a meeting within its limited open forum if such school uniformly
provides that(1) the meeting is voluntary and student-initiated;
(2) there is no sponsorship of the meeting by the school, the government,
or its agents or employees;
(3) employees or agents of the school or government are present at religious meetings only in a nonparticipatory capacity;
(4) the meeting does not materially and substantially interfere with the
orderly conduct of educational activities within the school; and
(5) nonschool persons may not direct, conduct, control, or regularly attend
activities of student groups.
(d)Nothing in this title shall be construed to authorize the United States or
any State or political subdivision thereof(1) to influence the form or content of any prayer or other religious
activity;
(2) to require any person to participate in prayer or other religious activity;
(3) to expend public funds beyond the incidental cost of providing the
space for student-initiated meetings;
(4) to compel any school agent or employee to attend a school meeting if
the content of the speech at the meeting is contrary to the beliefs of the agent
or employee;
(5) to sanction meetings that are otherwise unlawful;
(6) to limit the rights of groups of students which are not of a specified
numerical size; or
(7) to abridge the constitutional rights of any person.
(e) Notwithstanding the availability of any other remedy under the Constitution or the laws of the United States, nothing in this title shall be construed
to authorize the United States to deny or withhold Federal financial assistance
to any school.
(f) Nothing in this title shall be construed to limit the authority of the school,
its agents or employees, to maintain order and discipline on school premises,
to protect the well-being of students and faculty, and to assure that attendance
of students at meetings is voluntary.
DEFINITIONS
SEC. 803. As used in this title(1)The term "secondary school" means a public school which provides
secondary education as determined by State law.
(2) The term "sponsorship" includes the act of promoting, leading, or participating in a meeting. The assignment of a teacher, administrator, or other
school employee to a meeting for custodial purposes does not constitute sponsorship of the meeting.
(3) The term "meeting" includes those activities of student groups which are
permitted under a school's limited open forum and are not directly related to
the school curriculum.
(4) The term "noninstructional time" means time set aside by the school
before actual classroom instruction begins or after actual classroom instruction
ends.
SEVERABILITY
SEC. 804. If any provision of this title or the application thereof to any person
or circumstances is judicially determined to be invalid, the provisions of the
remainder of the title and the application to other persons or circumstances
shall not be affected thereby.

160
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tance."'1 65 According to the Act, the determination of which

schools are classified as "secondary" is to be made under state
law. 166 The Act does not contain any provisions concerning the

nature of the financial assistance that will bring a school within
its scope. However, numerous federal statutes contain similar
provisions, inaking them applicable to recipients of federal funding, and these provisions have frequently been subject to judicial
rulings. 167 The general thrust of such rulings is that this type of
statutory language should be broadly construed, to encompass
institutions receiving even indirect federal financial assistance.168 In consequence, because virtually all public secondary
schools receive at least some indirect financial aid from the
federal government, they will probably be deemed to be covered

by the Act. 169
The Act's central provision prohibits any school within its
scope from "deny[ing] equal access or a fair opportunity to, or
discriminat[ing] against, any students who wish to conduct a
meeting ...

on the basis of the religious, political, philosophi-

cal, or other content of the speech at such meetings," so long
as the school has a "limited open forum" and the students seek
to conduct their meeting within that forum.170 The Act defines
the critical term "limited open forum" as follows: "A public

CONSTRUCTION
SEC. 805. The provisions of this title shall supersede all other provisions of
Federal law that are inconsistent with the provisions of this title.
Id.No regulations have been issued under the Act.
16 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (Supp. 1985).
"6 Id. § 4072(1). A compendium of the definitions of secondary schools in all fifty
states and the District of Columbia is contained in AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS, EQUAL
AccEss: A PRACTICAL GUIDE, app. A 18 (1984) [hereinafter AJC GUIDE].
167See, e.g., Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 557, 569 (1984) (statutory
phrase "any educational program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance"
construed as encompassing college whose educational programs receive no direct federal
funding, but some of whose students receive federal financial aid; Court based this
broad reading in part on "longstanding and coherent administrative construction of the
phrase 'receiving Federal financial assistance"').
168Id.

169It is estimated that "[o]nly a handful of the approximately 16,000 public school
districts in the United States do not receive federal financial assistance of some kind."
Stern, Public Education, 10 URB. LAW. 497, 497 (1978). The Act's legislative history
reveals Congress's assumption that most public secondary schools would be encompassed by the federal funding language. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. H3857 (daily ed.
May 15, 1984) (statement of Rep. Edwards (D-Cal.)) (noting that Act's predecessor bill,
whose scope was defined in similar terms, would have injected "the imperial power of

the Federal Government ... into every one of the 15,517 school districts in the United

States").
270 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (Supp. 1985).
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secondary school has a limited open forum whenever such
school grants an offering or opportunity for one or more noncurriculum related student groups to meet on school premises
during noninstructional time.' 7' The operative terms in this
definition are "noncurriculum related" and "noninstructional
time."
The Act defines "noninstructional time" as "time set aside by
the school before actual classroom instruction begins or after
actual classroom instruction ends." 72 This definition does not
clarify the status of meetings that occur during the compulsory
attendance period when no instruction takes place. Two such
examples are lunch breaks and "student activity periods" such
as the one at issue in the Bender case. 73 However, the Act's
legislative history indicates that the "limited open forum" concept applies only to student group meetings which occur before
or after the entire compulsory attendance period, and not during
any portions of that period, even if no classroom instruction is
taking place. 74 Therefore, a school should not be deemed to
have created a limited open forum, and consequently should not
be subject to the Act's requirements, if it only allows student
groups to meet during the school day.
The Act contains no definition of the second crucial term in
its definition of "limited open forum": namely, "noncurriculum
related student groups." However, one section of the Act describes the meetings of these groups as "not directly related to
the school curriculum."' 175 This language suggests that a school
would become subject to the Act's requirements by granting
access to a student group which was indirectly related to the
school's curriculum. Consistent with this interpretation, the
17, Id.

§ 4071(b).
§ 4072(4).
"' The student religious group in Bender sought to meet during a thirty-minute "student activity period" which was regularly scheduled after the beginning of the school
day, two days per week. 741 F.2d at 543; see also 563 F. Supp. at 709.
174 See 130 CONG. REC. S8353 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatfield)
("The regular instructional period is what the school would have when classes first are
scheduled in the morning-maybe it is 8:30, maybe it is 9 o'clock-and it ends at 3:30.").
Although the legislative history contains some support for the contrary interpretation,
see 130 CONG. REC. S8356 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Denton (RAla.)), this appears to be the minority view. In contrast, the legislative history of
predecessor bills had clearly indicated that those bills sanctioned meetings during noninstructional time during the school day. See, e.g., Equal Access Amendment: A First
Amendment Question, Hearings on S. 815 and S. 1059 Before the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (Apr. 28 and Aug. 3, 1983).
17 20 U.S.C. § 4072(3) (Supp. 1985).
172Id.
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Act's legislative history indicates that the term "noncurriculum
related" was intended to be quite broad. For example, the legislative history suggests that the "noncurriculum related" label
would apply to the following types of student groups, all of
which are, at least arguably, indirectly related to the curriculum
of many schools: Latin clubs, soccer clubs, Young Democrats,
Young Republicans, religious clubs, 176 and humanitarian clubs
that raise funds for charity. 177 In contrast, the legislative history
indicates that curriculum related clubs are viewed rather narrowly, as those which are essentially extensions of the curric78
ulum and aid students in learning substantive course material.
The Act's relatively narrow definition of the types of student
clubs that may be permitted to meet on campus without triggering an equal access obligation or, alternatively phrased, its
relatively broad definition of the types of student clubs that will
trigger an equal access obligation, sharply distinguishes it from
the applicable constitutional principles. According to the Supreme Court's most recent rulings concerning the limited public
forum and nonpublic forum concepts, the government has wide
latitude to impose precise definitional limits upon the appropriate subject matter of such forums, and therefore to exclude
speakers or groups whose subjects are not within any such
tailored definition. 79 Under these decisions, schools may impose a wide range of subject matter limitations upon student
176130
17 130

CONG. REC. H7732 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Goodling).
CONG. REC. H7726 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Roukema).

178 Senator Hatfield stated that curriculum related clubs are "really a kind of extension
of the classroom," citing as an example a French club or a Spanish club that is formed
by students in a French or Spanish class for purposes of developing conversational

proficiency. 130 CONG. REC. S8342 (daily ed. June 27, 1984). The House debate supports

a similarly restrictive definition of curriculum related clubs. Representative Goodling
stated that a club would meet this description only if it satisfied both of the following

criteria: (1) it involves subject matter of a type that a public school may permissibly
sponsor, and (2) participation in it is "require[d]" or "directly encourage[d]" by the
school or a teacher "in connection with curriculum course work." 130 CONG. REc.
H7732 (daily ed. July 25, 1984).

In response to questioning, Senator Hatfield expressed the general view that the Act
does not seek to limit a school's discretion to draw the line between clubs that are
curriculum related and those that are not. See 130 CONG. REC. S8342 (daily ed. June
27, 1984). However, this general view is inconsistent with the specific criteria which
both he and Representative Goodling articulated for defining the curriculum related
concept.

Examples of curriculum related clubs that were cited during the congressional debates
include language clubs, drama clubs, athletic groups, cheerleading groups, and bands.
130 CONG. REC. S8342-43 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statements of Sen. Hatfield and
Sen. Gorton (R-Wash.)); 130 CONG. REc. H7732 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of
Rep. Goodling).
179See supra text accompanying notes 40-45.
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clubs, subject only to the strictures that any such limitations
must be reasonable, and must not be imposed for the sole pur-

pose of suppressing viewpoints with which school authorities
disagree.8 0
Consistent with the Court's most recent holdings, for example, a school might well be permitted to define the student
groups eligible for its forum as those relating to its curriculum

either directly or indirectly. Such a definition would fairly encompass many of the types of clubs that would likely be deemed

"noncurriculum related" under the Act's narrow construction
of that term, because they do not directly help students to learn
substantive course material. However, such a definition would
still not encompass the full panoply of political, philosophical,
and religious clubs to which a school would be required to grant

access under the Act. Under this type of definition, a school
could, for instance, permit political clubs on the rationale that
they are indirectly related to the school's civics courses, but
exclude philosophical or religious clubs on the rationale that the
school's curriculum contains no courses to which they are even
18
indirectly related.'
By drawing a dichotomy between the narrowly conceived
category of "noncurriculum related" clubs and all other clubs,
the Act gives schools virtually an all-or-nothing choice concern180See supra text accompanying

note 134.
1s1See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 3461-62
(1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (under majority's reasoning, university in Widmar
could permissibly have limited student forum to nonreligious student groups). Other
examples of subject matter distinctions are Cornelius and Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). The government, as suggested by the facts
of those cases themselves, is apparently authorized to deny access to any property not
deemed a general public forum. Just as Cornelius upheld the exclusion of "advocacy"
groups from a federal government workplace charity drive, so too a school could
probably exclude from a student forum student chapters or analogues of the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, and other
groups excluded in Cornelius. See Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3444. Moreover, because
Corneliusheld that the exclusion of any "controversial" group passed the reasonableness
test applicable to subject matter limitations upon limited public forums or nonpublic
forums, a school could well be allowed to limit a student forum to any group deemed
"noncontroversial." See supra text accompanying note 45.
Similarly, just as Perry upheld the exclusion from school mail facilities of a union
seeking to represent teachers, even though such facilities were open to various civic
and church organizations, a public school might well be permitted to limit a student
forum to civic and church organizations, but to exclude an organization seeking to
represent students. Moreover, because Perry held that the union which had been designated as the teachers' bargaining representative could use the forum without creating
access rights on the part of a rival union, a school could presumably allow the schoolrecognized student government to use the student forum without creating access rights
on the part of other groups also seeking to represent student interests.
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ing the subject matter limitations upon student clubs that will
be permitted to meet in any limited open forum. To retain the
right to enforce any subject matter limitations, a school may
not let any club meet which is not directly related to the school
curriculum (unless such club meets during instructional time or
otherwise fails to comply with the Act's prerequisites for a
limited open forum). By leaving schools with only these two,
widely disparate choices concerning subject matter limitations
upon student clubs, 82 the Act substantially narrows the broad
discretion that schools have under current constitutional
83

principles. 1

Following its core provision, which prohibits any contentbased denial of "equal access or a fair opportunity to" student
groups in any limited open forum, the Equal Access Act provides that a school "shall be deemed to offer a fair opportunity
to students who wish to conduct a meeting within its limited
open forum" if the school uniformly complies with five specified
conditions: 84 (1) meetings are "voluntary and student-initiated";
(2) there is no school or government "sponsorship";' 85 (3) any
school or government employees or agents "are present at religious meetings only in a nonparticipatory capacity";
(4) meetings do not "materially and substantially interfere with
the orderly conduct of educational activities within the
182 See Student Coalition for Peace v. Lower Merion School Dist., 776 F.2d 431, 442
n.9 (3d Cir. 1985) ("We read the Act to give affected school districts a choice: either to
create a limited open forum open to all student groups on an equal basis, or to refuse
access to all noncurriculum groups."). Accord YALE Note, supra note 23, at 204 n.74
("Congress intended to present at least one choice under the Act ...whether to let all
stqdent groups, including religious ones, meet, or ...not to give access to any student
groups.").
183 There is another significant distinction between the constitutional and statutory
standards regarding a school's discretion to create a limited student forum. Under
constitutional standards, a court will not find that a school created such a forum in the
face of evidence of a contrary intent. However, a school's intent not to create a forum
for speech concerning certain subjects will not deter a court from finding that it nevertheless did so, by virtue of the Equal Access Act. See infra note 266 and accompanying
text. According to critics of the Court's recent decisions increasing governmental discretion to impose subject matter limitations upon "limited public forums," this increased
discretion enables the government to impose content-based restrictions on speech. See
supra notes 46 & 47. These critics would probably welcome the Act's constraints upon
governmental discretion to limit the subject matter of student forums as a return to
traditional free speech principles.
184
20 U.S.C. § 4071(c) (Supp. 1985).
185The term "sponsorship" is defined to include "promoting, leading, or participating"
in a meeting. Furthermore, the Act's definition of "sponsorship" expressly excludes a
school employee's assignment to a meeting for "custodial purposes." 20 U.S.C. § 4072(2)
(Supp. 1985).

1987]

Equal Access Act

165

school"; 186 and (5) "nonschool persons may not direct, conduct,
control, or regularly attend activities of student groups.

18 7

Neither the language nor the legislative history of this provision clarifies whether the five conditions are permissive or man-

datory. 188 Although there has not yet been any judicial analysis
of this section, other analyses support the co'ntention that all of

the specified conditions must be satisfied.18 9 Regardless of
whether Congress intended these conditions to be enforced in

all limited open forums, they should all be enforced as a matter
of constitutional law with respect to student religious groups.190
lB6 This language is apparently derived from Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (public school may restrict students' expressive
conduct only if it would "materially and substantially interfere with the work of the
school or impinge upon the rights of other students").
117 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(5) (Supp. 1985).
181For example, 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(5) (Supp. 1985) provides that outsiders "may not
direct, control, or regularly attend" student group meetings. This language may be read
as evincing a congressional intent to prohibit the outsider participation described, and
there are indications in the legislative history that it was so intended. However, the
language is also consistent with a reading that schools may, in their discretion, prohibit
such outsider participation, and the legislative history also contains support for this
alternative reading. See AJC GUIDE, supra note 166, at 7-8.
189See, e.g., YALE Note, supra note 23, at 193 & n.35; Note, Student Religious
Groups and the Right of Access to Public School Activity Periods, 74 GEo. L.J. 163,
214-15 (1985) [hereinafter GEORGETOWN Note]; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF

FLORIDA, GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF THE EQUAL ACCESS ACT 9-11 (1985); ANTIDEFAMATION LEAGUE,

RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, THE AFTERMATH OF

EQUAL ACCESS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 8-9 (1984); AJC GUIDE, supra note 166, at 7-

8. The United States Government has also espoused the position that these conditions
must be complied with before a school will be deemed to have created a limited open
forum. See Intervenor-United States Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion for Final Summary Judgment, Amidei v. Spring Branch Indep. School Dist.,

No. H-84-4673 (S.D.Tex. Apr. 17, 1985) at 20.
190Unless the meetings are voluntary and student-initiated, as required by the first
condition, see supra text following note 184, no student free speech or associational
rights are implicated, and hence no forum is created. See FORDHAM Note, supra note
42, at 560-61 (any place where audience is "captive," rather than voluntarily present,
should not be considered public forum). Moreover, any student religious group meeting
that is initiated by a school, or at which attendance is compelled by a school, would
violate the Establishment Clause. See supra text accompanying note 32. See also YALE
Note, supra note 23, at 193 n.35 (Establishment Clause would be violated by schoolinitiated meetings, and students' free exercise rights would be implicated by nonvoluntary meetings).

Likewise, if there is any school or government sponsorship, as prohibited by the
second condition, see supra text accompanying note 185, the meetings of a student
religious club would violate the Establishment Clause. Moreover, the prohibition upon
school "sponsorship" of any student group meeting-which the Act defines as "promoting, leading, or participating," see supra note 185-further ensures that the meetings
are voluntarily initiated and run by students, thus giving rise to free speech and associational rights.
The third condition, see supra text following note 185, which confines any school or
governmental role in a student religious meeting to a nonparticipatory one, is identical

to one of the essential criteria that this Article prescribes as a prerequisite for an open
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B. Case Law InterpretingAct

Only two cases asserting claims under the Equal Access Act
have to date resulted in reported judicial rulings. In addition,
the author has obtained unreported slip opinions in two other
cases which allege claims under the Act. Of these four cases,
one involved a teachers' group in a primary school, thus clearly
falling outside the Act's scope. 19 1 In contrast, the other three
cases, two of which involved student religious groups, did raise
92
colorable claims under the Act.
1. Student Coalitionfor Peace v. Lower Merion School
District

The Merion 93 case graphically illustrates the Act's expansion
of students' free speech access rights beyond those which the
student forum. This condition is designed to counter reasonable student perceptions
that the school endorses a religious group which meets in the forum. See supra text
accompanying notes 150-53.
The fourth requirement-that the meetings not materially and substantially interfere
with the school's educational activities-simply paraphrases the definition in Tinker of
the outer boundary of public school students' free speech rights, consistent with both
the school's educational mission and the free speech rights of others within the school.
See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509; see supra text accompanying note 186.
Finally, the fifth condition-which prohibits nonschool personnel from directing or
regularly attending student group meetings, see supra text accompanying note 187follows from the fundamental requirement that any meetings must be voluntarily initiated
and controlled by students as a precondition for the existence of a forum giving rise to
student free speech or associational rights. See supra text accompanying note 187.
The Act contains several additional provisions beyond the ones that have been
discussed in the text. However, these remaining provisipns are less significant for
purposes of the present analysis. Rather than prescribing conditions under which covered schools must grant equal access, most of these other provisions disclaim congressional intent to authorize schools to take various actions that would raise problems
under either the Establishment Clause (for example, requiring any person to participate
in prayer or other religious activity; see 20 U.S.C. § 4071(d)(2) (Supp. 1985)), or the
Free Speech Clause (for example, limiting the rights of student groups that are not of a
specified numerical size; see 20 U.S.C. § 4071(d)(6) (Supp. 1985)).
19'May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp., 615 F. Supp. 761 (S.D. Ind. 1985),
aff'd, 787 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir. 1986).
"9 Student Coalition for Peace v. Lower Merion School Dist., 633 F. Supp 1040 (E.D.
Pa. 1986); Mergens v. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Community Schools, No. CV 85-0-426
(D. Neb. May 23, 1985); Amidei v. Spring Branch Indep. School Dist., No. H-84-4673
(S.D. Tex. July 1, 1985). These cases are discussed in order of the amount of information
available about the rationales for the judicial rulings therein. The first case discussed
has resulted in four reported decisions, including one by a circuit court of appeals; the
second case discussed has resulted in one slip opinion explaining the denial of plaintiffs'
motion for preliminary injunction; and the third case discussed resulted in an order of
final judgment unaccompanied by any memorandum or opinion.
'9 This lawsuit has generated four reported decisions: 596 F. Supp. 169 (E.D. Pa.
1984) (denying plaintiff's motion for permanent injunction, which was based on Free
Speech Clause claim); 618 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (denying plaintiff's motion for
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Supreme Court currently recognizes as a matter of constitutional
principles. When premised on the Free Speech Clause, the students' access claim was denied. 94 However, when that very
same claim was premised on the Equal Access Act, it was
95
granted. 1
Although the Merion litigation concerned a request for equal
access by a nonreligious student group, it spawned judicial rulings about the Act's scope which would pertain as well to access
claims by student religious groups. The Student Coalition for
Peace (SCP), an organization of high school students advocating
a nuclear freeze, sought access to various areas on the school
premises to conduct a "peace exposition." Outside speakers
196
were to participate, and the public at large was to be invited.
When the school denied this request, SCP commenced a lawsuit,
asserting that the areas in question were limited public forums,
and hence that the school's denial violated SCP's free speech
rights.
The district court rejected SCP's claims because it found that
the school had not designated any of the disputed areas as
limited public forums for "political" speech, as the court characterized SCP's contemplated peace exposition. Although the
district court recognized that the school had previously allowed
two of these areas to be used for several events lacking school
sponsorship, the court characterized such events as "primarily
athletic and for the purpose of raising funds for a public charity,"
and thus distinguishable from SCP's planned peace exposition. 97 The court therefore deemed these areas to be nonpublic
forums, and hence subject to any access restrictions which are
reasonable and not designed to suppress particular viewpoints.
The district court concluded that the school's denial of SCP's
reconsideration of previous decision, based upon subsequently enacted Equal Access
Act); 776 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1985) (affirming district court's rejection of plaintiff's
constitutional claim, but vacating and remanding its judgment regarding plaintiff's statutory claim); and 633 F. Supp. 1040 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (opinion following circuit court's
remand, granting plaintiff's request for permanent injunction, based on Equal Access

Act).
19 596 F. Supp. 169 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
195
633 F. Supp. at 1043.
'9 596 F. Supp. at 170-71.
197Id. at 174. The- nonschool-sponsored events which the school had previously
permitted on its premises included: a "Special Olympics" for handicapped children
sponsored by the Jaycees; a "Bike Hike" for mentally handicapped citizens; the American Cancer Society's "Jog-A-Thon"; and a student-organized "Volleyball Marathon"
(a charitable event in which participants solicited pledges from the community for each
hour of volleyball played). Id. at 173.
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access request complied with the foregoing standards because
the school's "desire[] to keep the podium of politics off school
grounds" was reasonable, and because SCP had not produced
any evidence that the school sought to censor it because of its
98
viewpoint. 1
Following the enactment of the Equal Access Act, SCP made
a motion for reconsideration of the district court's ruling. SCP
contended that, because the school had permitted other studentinitiated, noncurriculum related activities to occur on an athletic
field and in a gymnasium, the school had made these areas into
limited open forums under the Act. 199 In denying SCP's motion,
the district court emphasized that SCP planned to invite members of the general public to its peace exposition, and cited
legislative history indicating that the Act did not expand the
access rights of nonstudents. Consequently, the district court
concluded that the Act was
not applicable to the narrow question raised by the plaintiff,
namely, whether or not a school district may deny access to
its facilities to a noncurriculum related student group which
intends to invite nonstudents/the general public ... where
it has not been a policy or practice of the school to indiscriminately permit the use of the facilities in question ...
for similar purposes. 20 0
Although the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings
on SCP's constitutional claims, it vacated and remanded the
district court's judgment regarding SCP's Equal Access Act
claims . 20 The appellate court rejected the school's contention
that the Act does not apply to activities involving nonstudents,
concluding that "student groups wishing to invite nonstudents
onto school property are protected by the Act if the school's
limited open forum encompasses nonstudent participation in
student events .... 202 However, the Third Circuit expressed
no opinion concerning whether the Merion school district had
created this type of limited open forum or whether it had created
any limited open forum at all. Rather, it noted that the trial had
occurred before the Act's effective date, thus necessarily failing
to generate any evidence concerning what the Circuit Court
,98
Id. at 174-75.
t99
618 F. Supp. at 55.
100Id. at 60.
201776 F.2d at 443.
202Id. at 442.
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deemed the material issue on this point: namely, whether the
school had evinced its intent to create a limited open forum
20 3
after the Act's effective date.
On remand, the school renewed the contention which the

district court had previously accepted in rejecting SCP's constitutional claim: that its past grants of access for charitable or
athletic events did not create a forum to which SCP had an
access right for a political event. Although the district court
reiterated its view that SCP had no constitutionally-based right

of access, it accepted SCP's contention that "the Equal Access
Act expands First Amendment rights to free speech."' 204 While

constitutional authorities permitted a school to designate a limited forum for nonpolitical speech only, the district court explained, the Act prohibits it from doing so. 205 SCP introduced
evidence that, after the Equal Access Act's effective date, the

school had permitted a student-initiated noncurriculum related
event, to which the public was invited (specifically, a charitable
volleyball marathon), 2 6 to take place in the gymnasium during
noninstructional time. Accordingly, the district court ruled that
SCP had satisfied its burden of proving that the school had made
the gymnasium into a limited open forum to which SCP's peace
207
exposition should be granted equal access.
201
Id. at 442-43. The court explained:
We read the Act to give affected school districts a choice: either to create a
limited open forum open to all student groups on an equal basis, or to refuse
access to all noncurricular student groups. For this choice to be a real one, we
think schools must be given the opportunity to choose with full knowledge of
the consequences of each alternative. We believe it would be inconsistent with
this principle for us to find that the appellees here had created a limited open
forum under the Act before the Act's adoption, and thus before the choice
could be a meaningful one.
Id. at 442.
-04
633 F. Supp. at 1043.
2'0Id. The court asserted that
[alt first blush it appears that Congress was attempting to expand the application
of the Supreme Court's decision in Widmar v. Vincent ...rather than expand
the concept of a limited public forum when it drafted the Equal Access Act.
However, after further analysis, I find Congress sought also to prohibit the
denial of noncurricular related student groups' meetings on the basis of subject
matter, namely as to religious, political, philosophical or other content of the
speech .... Thus, I find that Congress did, by enacting the Equal Access Act,
afford students the right to use school property beyond the constitutional
guarantees in the first amendment.
Id. (footnote omitted).
206 See 596 F. Supp. at 173.
207 633 F. Supp. at 1042-43. As evidenced by its position in the litigation, the Lower
Merion School District had not intended to create a forum open to all student religious,
political, philosophical and other speech. The district court's ruling on remand therefore
underscores another significant distinction between the Free Speech Clause standards
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2. Mergens v. Board of Education of Westside Community
Schools
Although the Mergens2 8 case has not yet resulted in a final
judgment, 2 9 the district court's opinion denying plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction contains some discussion of the
Equal Access Act. 210 Especially because there are as yet so few
judicial discussions of any aspect of the Act, this opinion is
noteworthy.
In early 1985, some students at Westside High School (a
public secondary school that received federal funds) sought permission to form a Christian fellowship which would meet on
school premises on the same terms as other student groups.
When the school denied this permission, the students brought a
lawsuit, contending that the school had violated the Equal Access Act as well as the First Amendment. The school authorities
contended that the Equal Access Act did not apply to Westside
High School, because the school had no limited open forum
sufficient to trigger the Act's requirements. The school authorities further argued that, if the Act was deemed applicable to
Westside High School and required it to grant access to the
proposed Christian fellowship, the Act would violate the Establishment Clause.
The central issue concerning the Act's applicability to Westside High School was whether any of the thirty-one student
organizations already permitted to meet at the school were "nonconcerning'subject matter restrictions on limited public forums and the Act's standards
(aside from the government's reduced discretion, under the Act, to impose such restric-

tions). Under recent constitutional precedents, evidence that the government does not
intend to grant access to certain speakers or subject matter would preclude a conclusion

that any forum had been created which did include such speakers or subject matter;
under the Act, in contrast, a "limited open forum" is deemed to have been created
whenever the government has taken certain actions, regardless of its intent. See infra
note 261 & accompanying text.
208 No. CV 85-0-426 (D. Neb. May 23, 1985), which is pending in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Nebraska. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance
of Douglas Veith, attorney for plaintiffs, in providing copies of pleadings and other
papers which have been filed in the Mergens case (on file at HARV. J. ON LEoIS.).
209At

the time of printing, the trial was scheduled to commence in late March or early

April, 1986. Telephone conversation with law clerk to Douglas Veith, attorney for

plaintiffs (Dec. 4, 1986).
210No. CV 85-0-426, slip op. (D. Neb. May 23, 1985). Pursuant to an order dated
November 6, 1985, the court also denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. No.
CV 85-0-426, Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (D. Neb. Nov.
6, 1985). However, this ruling was not accompanied by any memorandum or opinion
addressing the issues in the case.
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as required for a finding that the school

had created a "limited open forum" under the Act. 212 The court
noted that some of the student organizations, for example, a

volunteer service organization associated with the Rotary Club
of America, or a club for students interested in skin and scuba

diving, had only a "tenuous" relationship to the school's "actual
curriculum," although they could "definitely be linked to the
school's educational mission.

'21 3

The court indicated that a final

determination of whether any such clubs ought to be classified
as "noncurriculum related" should be postponed pending sub-

mission of evidence at trial. However, the court expressed its
preliminary conclusion that these clubs were noncurriculum related and that therefore the school was subject to the Act's
21 4
requirements.
The court nonetheless declined to rule that plaintiffs were

likely to prevail on the merits. It concluded that serious questions were raised by the schools' contention that construing the
Act to mandate access for the proposed Christian fellowship
would violate the Establishment Clause. The court based this

conclusion on its perception of the danger that granting access
to plaintiffs' club could create a reasonable appearance of school
support for religion. It explained that this danger arose from
several factors which distinguish the typical high school student

215
forum from the university student forum at issue in Widmar.
Consistent with this posited typical high school situation, the
2I Mergens, slip op. at 6-7.
212See supra text accompanying notes 171 & 175-78.
223 Mergens, slip op. at 6.
224Id. at 6-7. For purposes

of ruling on the preliminary injunction motion, the court
did not discuss any other reason why the Act might not govern student group meetings
at Westside High School. However, in an affidavit submitted in opposition to plaintiffs'
subsequently filed summary judgment motion, the Westside High principal made certain
allegations which could raise other problems concerning the Act's applicability: that
each student club at Westside High is required to be sponsored by a member of the
faculty or administration; that each sponsor is obligated to direct, supervise, and control
the activities of the sponsored club; and that sponsorship of student clubs is a factor in
determining faculty compensation. Affidavit of James E. Findley, Principal of Westside
High School, sworn October 28, 1985, at 2 9, Mergens v. Bd. of Educ. of Westside
Community Schools (D. Neb. May 23, 1985) (No. CV 85-0-426) (on file at HARV. J. ON
LEGIs.).
If proven at trial, these facts could lead to the conclusion that Westside High School
is not covered by the Act because it has not met the requirements for a "limited open
forum"; the Act's provisions at least arguably prohibit school sponsorship of any meeting
(20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(2) (Supp. 1985)), or teacher participation in any religious club
meeting (20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(3) (Supp. 1985)), or the expenditure of public funds beyond
the incidental cost of providing the space for student-initiated meetings (20 U.S.C.
§ 4071(d)(3) (Supp. 1985)). See supra text accompanying notes 184-90.
225Mergens, slip op. at 10.
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court noted, Westside High School sought to keep its student
clubs "within a reasonably close relationship to the school's
deemed "contromission," and none of the extant clubs 2were
16
versial or potentially divisive in nature.
3. Amidei v. Spring Branch Independent School District

The Amidei2t 7 case is the only one of the three discussed in
this section that concerns the rights of student religious groups
under the Equal Access Act and has been litigated to a conclusion. 218 Without issuing any memorandum or opinion explaining
its ruling, the district court entered an order of final judgment
in favor of public high school students seeking to conduct religious meetings under the Act. The court permanently enjoined
the school district from refusing to permit the student religious
group to meet at a high school "during non-instructional time

(as defined in the Equal Access Act) at a time any other student
club regularly meets. 2 1 9 The school district did not appeal from
this judgment.
Just as the Merion ruling demonstrates the extent to which
the Act expands the protection of free speech interests above

that accorded by constitutionally-based judicial decisions, so
the Amidei ruling demonstrates the extent to which the Act
contracts the protection of nonestablishment concerns, below
216Id. The court also noted that an imprimatur of school approval could potentially
be bestowed upon plaintiff Christian fellowship by virtue of the fact that such fellowship
would presumably-like other student clubs-be officially recognized and seek to use
school media. Id. at 11.
The Mergens preliminary injunction opinion highlights the discrepancy between the
Act's criteria for permitting student religious clubs to meet in public schools and the
corresponding Establishment Clause criteria. The Act requires public schools to grant
equal access to any religious club as long as at least one other "noncurriculum related"
club is given the opportunity to meet. But the term "noncurriculum related" is quite
broad, encompassing even clubs that are indirectly related to the curriculum. See supra
text accompanying notes 175-78. Therefore, even if the only other club or clubs meeting
at a school were related to the curriculum-albeit indirectly-a religious club would
still have to be granted equal access. Under such circumstances, noting that other
student groups were indirectly related to the curriculum, reasonable students might well
infer that the school endorsed all student groups meeting at school, including the
religious group. This risk was expressly recognized by the Mergens court. Mergens,
slip op. at 11. See infra text accompanying note 244.
217No. H-84-4673 (S.D. Tex. July 1,1985). The author gratefully acknowledges the
assistance of Harvey G. Brown, Jr. (attorney for plaintiffs), Jeffrey A. Davis (attorney
for defendants), and Cathleen A. Fanis (secretary to Mr. Davis) in providing copies of
the pleadings and other papers which have been filed in the Amidei case.
218Just as the Amidei decision is unreported, so too there may be other unreported
decisions which also adjudicate Equal Acess Act claims by student religious groups.

219
Amidei, slip. op. at 1-2.
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that accorded by such decisions. The Amidei federal district
court upheld the equal access claim of a student religious group
despite the fact that all four circuit courts of appeals which had
considered similar claims had rejected them on Establishment
Clause grounds. 220 Moreover, the district court which rendered
the Amidei decision is within a circuit whose court of appeals
exclusion of student
had indicated support for a categorical 221
religious groups from public high schools.
Although the Amidei court did not issue any written rationale
for its ruling, that rationale can be inferred from the parties'
written submissions.222 The material facts involved in Amidei
were essentially identical to those involved in Mergens. A group
of students sought to form a "Christian Club" which would meet
at Westchester Senior High School one evening per week, during a period which the school had set aside for meetings of
"administratively approved" clubs. To receive such approval
from the school's principal, a club had to have a faculty sponsor,
and had to be "serious, worthwhile" and permissible under state
law. 223 The responsibility of each club's sponsoring faculty member, who was expected to attend all meetings, was to ensure the
to supervise the students,
proper use of the school facilities,
224
and to enforce school rules.
When the school denied plaintiffs' request for administrative
approval, apparently on Establishment Clause grounds, plaintiffs instituted a lawsuit asserting that this denial violated both
the Equal Access Act and the Constitution. The school district
responded that the Act was not applicable, because Westchester
High School had not created a limited open forum, and that if
220 See
221This

supra text accompanying notes 69-87.

indication was contained in the Lubbock case discussed supra text accom-

panying notes 72-74.
22 The parties submitted a lengthy and detailed Stipulation of Facts, and then made

cross motions for summary judgment based upon these facts as well as several affidavits.
The parties also filed several legal memoranda. (On file at the HARV. J. ON LEGIS.).
223Affidavit

of Frazier Dealy, Building Principal at Westchester Senior High School,

sworn April 25, 1985 at 4, Amidei v. Spring Branch Indep. School Dist. (in support of

Defendant's Supplement to Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion for Final Summary Judgment).
224 Stipulation

of Facts,

44, filed March 28, 1985, Amidei v. Spring Branch Indep.

School Dist. But see Affidavit of Frazier Dealy, supra note 223, at 4 (both the school
district and Westchester High School required each teacher sponsor "to actively promote, supervise, lead and participate in student club activities."). In any event, the
plaintiffs offered to forego any participation in their meetings by the faculty sponsor
and also to have rfonfaculty sponsors who were not ministers or other religious leaders.
72(a), (g), (o), (p), (q), (w), (x), (z).
Stipulation of Facts,
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the Act were deemed applicable, it violated the Establishment
225
Clause.
The central issue concerning the Act's applicability in Amidei,
as in Mergens, was whether any of the clubs which had previously been granted access fit within the "noncurriculum related"
concept. As in Mergens, the Amidei situation involved no clubs
that discussed religion, politics, or philosophy, and none that
could be deemed potentially controversial or divisive. Moreover, as in Mergens, the clubs involved in Amidei could all be
viewed as at least indirectly connected to the curriculum.22 6
Nevertheless, just as the Mergens court indicated it probably
would do, the Amidei court definitively ruled that at least one
noncurriculum related club had been given the opportunity to
meet at the school during noninstructional time, therefore trig227
gering the Act's applicability.
The factual similarity between Mergens and Amidei pertains
not only to the issue of whether a limited open forum existed,
but also to the issue of whether a student religious group meeting
would violate the Establishment Clause. The facts in Amidei
closely paralleled those particular facts in Mergens which the
Mergens court had cited as raising Establishment Clause problems: the school officials in Amidei also "maintain[ed] close
supervision over student organizations"; the school in Amidei
also attempted "to keep its student clubs within a reasonably
close relationship to the school's administration"; and none of
the extant clubs in the Amidei situation were "controversial or
potentially divisive in nature. 22 8 Notwithstanding these facts,
which had deterred the Mergens court from concluding that the
student religious group would be likely to prevail on the Establishment Clause issue, the Amidei court concluded that student
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, undated; Response to Plaintiff's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion for Final Summary
Judgment, at 4, 9, filed April 9, 1985, Amidei v. Spring Branch Indep. School Dist.
226

The examples of Westchester High School's clubs which plaintiff characterized as

"noncurriculum related," to support their assertion that the school had created a limited

open forum under the Act, were the following: "Senior Girls," "Senior Boys," and "Run
Through" (all of which focused on boosting school spirits in connection with football
games), "Junior Achievement," and "Students Against Drunk Driving." Stipulation of
Facts,
50, 51, 53, 54, 55.
227The

school district did not press the argument that the Act could be deemed

inapplicable for the separate reason that faculty sponsors participated in student club
meetings. See Stipulation of Facts, 44. It is unclear from the parties' submissions
whether this participation was limited to custodial supervision. See supra note 224.
218See also supra text accompanying notes 215-16; Affidavit of Frazier Dealy, supra
note 223, at 2-3.
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religious group meetings would not violate the Establishment
Clause.
Absent any opinion directly stating the judge's reason for
concluding that the Christian Club meetings would comply with
the Establishment Clause, it must be presumed that those reasons include at least some that were advanced in plaintiffs' legal
memoranda. In support of their position that Christian Club
meetings in Westchester High School's limited open forum
would not be perceived as school-endorsed, the plaintiffs submitted as evidence the fact that the plaintiffs offered to take
various steps, which departed from Westchester High School's
normal policies, to minimize the risk of reasonable perceptions
that the school promoted their Christian Club. 229 The plaintiffs
submitted the affidavit of a child psychiatrist, who had treated
over 2500 high school students, and set out her opinions that
the majority of high school students are sufficiently mature to
understand that an equal access policy does not place the government's imprimatur upon religion, and that students would
perceive the school district's refusal to permit plaintiffs to meet
as hostility toward religion. 230 The plaintiffs also submitted affidavits of individual students at Westchester High School stating that they would not view the school's equal access grant to
the Christian Club as school endorsement of religion, but that
they would view denial of equal access as the school's hostility
23
toward religion. '
Similar evidence had been introduced by the plaintiffs in the
Mergens case, 2 2 but had not persuaded the court that the plaintiffs were likely to overcome the school district's Establishment
Clause defense. The similarity between the material facts and
evidence in Mergens and Amidei, juxtaposed with the differing
S29The plaintiffs made the following offers: to forego use of the school media and
inclusion in the school yearbook; to post a disclaimer outside the room where they met;
to forego attendance by any teacher or school employee, oi to have two different school

personnel attend the meetings on a rotating basis to minimize the likelihood that such
attendance could be construed as sponsorship; and to have present at their meetings,
solely for custodial purposes, an adult who is neither employed by the school district
nor a minister or other religious leader. Stipulation of Facts,
72(a)-(z).
230Affidavit of Juanita T. Hart, M.D., sworn March 5, 1985, Amidei v. Spring Branch
Indep. School Dist.

13 See, e.g., Affidavit of Steven Morris, sworn March 26, 1985, Amidei v. Spring

Branch Indep. School Dist.; Affidavit of Steve Ringer, sworn March 8, 1985, Amidei v.
Spring Branch Indep. School Dist.; Affidavit of Courtney Green, sworn March 8, 1985,

Amidei v. Spring Branch Indep. School Dist.
23 See Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts at 10, Mergens v. Bd. of Educ. of
Westside Community Schools (D. Neb. May 23, 1985) (No. CV 85-0-426).
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judicial rulings in these two cases, underscores the ambiguous
state of current law concerning the Act's constitutionality.
C. ComparisonBetween Act and Proposed ConstitutionallyBased Standards
As indicated by both the language and the operation of the
Equal Access Act, the Act is more protective of free speech
than of nonestablishment values. Moreover, the Act is more
protective of free speech values, but less protective of nonestablishment values, than the Court has been. Accordingly, the
distinctions between the constitutionally-based analytical approach to equal access issues proposed in this Article, and the
one set forth in the Equal Access Act, fall into two basic
categories.
On the one hand, some of these distinctions result in the Act's
imposing fewer limitations upon equal access grants than are
required by constitutional precepts-specifically, those relating
to nonestablishment concerns. With respect to this first category
of distinctions, an equal access grant may fully comply with the
Act, yet nevertheless violate the Establishment Clause. On the
other hand, some distinctions between the constitutionally-derived requirements and the ones prescribed in the Act result in
the Act's imposing upon schools additional obligations to grant
equal access, beyond those they bear under constitutional
norms-specifically, those relating to free speech concerns.
With respect to this second category of distinctions, a school's
denial of equal access may fully comply with Free Speech
Clause standards, yet nevertheless violate the Act. These two
categories of distinctions are discussed in turn below.
1. Some Grants of Equal Access May Comply with the Act
but Violate the Establishment Clause
There is a major, overarching distinction between the constitutionally-grounded approach to equal access problems that is
proposed in this Article and the approach embodied in the Act.
In accordance with the constitutional law principles from which
it is derived, the Article's recommended analytical framework
gives the equal access opponent the opportunity to overcome
any prima facie showing that a school has created a student
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forum which gives rise to an equal access right. This prima facie
showing can be overcome by demonstrating a countervailing
compelling state interest-that an equal access grant would violate the Establishment Clause. 233 In contrast, the Act provides
no opportunity to overcome an access claim by showing countervailing establishment (or other compelling) concerns. The Act
thus creates an irrebuttable presumption that compliance with
its specifications for a limited open forum necessarily eliminates
any potential Establishment Clause problems which could result
from student religious meetings on public school premises.
This Article has delineated a number of specific factors that
are relevant in determining the constitutionality of an equal
access grant to a student religious group. Consistent with applicable constitutional authorities, this Article recognizes that
the dispositive issue must remain whether, under all the facts
and circumstances involved in any particular case, such an access grant would reasonably be perceived as conveying the
school's approval of religion. 234 A court's analysis of this ultimate constitutional issue should be facilitated by focusing on
the specific factors articulated in this Article. However, an assessment of these factors, as well as any other factors, cannot
displace the court's determination of the ultimate underlying
issue. A school's compliance with the specified criteria for creating an open student forum subject to the recommended content-neutral restrictions should minimize the risk that reasonable
students would perceive the school's equal access grant as conveying its approval of religion. Nevertheless, this risk cannot
be entirely eliminated even by compliance with the proposed
conditions.
For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that no list of particular limitations upon an equal access grant to a student religious group could possibly be devised which would always prevent reasonable students from perceiving the grant as conveying
the school's approval of religion. 2 5 But even putting aside the

233See supra text accompanying notes 149-53.
34 See supra note 28; see also text following note 139 & text accompanying notes
154-61.
35 See supra notes 142-44; text accompanying note 136. See also YALE Note, supra

note 23, at 206-07 n.82:
Because of the delicate balance between free exercise and free speech rights
on one hand, and the Establishment Clause on the other, decisions on religious
issues often turn on the unique facts of the case .... Thus the Act may be
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hypothetical impossibility of this task, the particular limitations
upon equal access grants to. student religious groups which are
specified in the Equal Access Act clearly leave open a substantial possibility that reasonable students would perceive at least
some such grants as conveying the school's approval of religion.
Consequently, an equal access grant to a student religious group
could fully comply with the Act, yet still violate the Establishment Clause. The following discussion outlines the most significant respects in which the Act's criteria for permissible equal
access grants fail to foreclose the possibility that such grants
would violate the Establishment Clause.
As outlined above, 2 6 the Act requires a school within its
scope to grant equal access to all student groups regardless of
their subject matter, including student religious groups, so long
as the school has granted an "opportunity for" at least one
"noncurriculum related student group to meet on school premises during noninstructional time. '237 The Act can be read as
prescribing no additional preconditions for the creation of equal
access rights.
The Act can also be read as prescribing the following additional preconditions for the creation of equal access rights: any
meeting must be voluntary and student-initiated; no meeting
may be sponsored by the school or the government; school or
government employees or agents may be present at any religious
meeting only in a nonparticipatory capacity; no meeting may
materially and substantially interfere with the school's educational activities; and nonschool persons may not direct, conduct,
238
control or regularly attend any activities of the student groups.
Even assuming the debatable proposition that the Act makes
the foregoing additional conditions mandatory rather than discretionary, 23 9 a school's compliance with all of them would still
not necessarily prevent reasonable students from viewing an
equal access grant to a student religious group as conveying the
school's approval of religion. This conclusion can be substantiated by considering the additional prerequisites, beyond those
seen as encroaching ... upon the judiciary's proper role in interpreting the
constitutional religion clauses.
Id.
136See supra text accompanying notes 170-71.
21120 U.S.C. § 4071(b) (Supp. 1985).
238 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071(c)(1)-(c)(5) (Supp. 1985).
39 See supra text accompanying notes 184-90.
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set forth in the Act, which the present Article has recommended
for any such grant to comply with the Establishment Clause.
First, this Article recommends that no student forum should
be deemed to exist, sufficient to entitle a student religious group
to access, unless it was created for a secular purpose. Absent
compliance with this requirement, an equal access grant to a
student religious group would violate the Establishment
Clause. 240 In contrast, under the Act, a school could create a
limited open forum specifically at the behest of one or more
student religious groups. Nothing in the Act would prevent a
school from designating such a forum for the express purpose
of permitting one or more student religious groups to meet on
school premises, a scenario that would surely give rise to serious
Establishment Clause concerns.
Second, also reflecting constitutional dictates, the Article proposes that a student religious group will not have an equal access
right to a student forum unless that forum is open to a sufficiently broad range of subjects to include religion without singling it out. Unless a school complies with this requirement,
reasonable students could infer that the school's equal access
grant to a student religious group manifests its approval of religion. 2 4 1 Under the Act, in contrast, a limited open forum will
be deemed to exist, obligating the school to allow student religious groups to meet on its premises, as long as the school has
done so little as to grant an opportunity to meet to a single
noncurriculum related student group.2 42 Indeed, as previously
noted, that single group could itself be religious, thus creating
a significant danger of reasonably inferred school support for
religion.
Even if the forum is not initially opened expressly for the
purpose of accommodating a religious group, the Act's failure
to require subject matter breadth still engenders substantial risks
of Establishment Clause violations. The Act's legislative history
indicates that the term "noncurriculum related" is broadly construed, to include all groups except those which are essentially
direct extensions of the school's curriculum. 243 Therefore, a
school's obligation to allow religious groups to meet could be
triggered merely by its permitting one nonreligious student
240See

supra text accompanying note 144.

241See supra text accompanying notes
24220 U.S.C. § 4071(b) (Supp. 1985).
243See

146-48.

supra text accompanying notes 175-78.

180
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group to meet to discuss a subject related to the school's curriculum (albeit indirectly). Such a scenario would entail a significant danger that reasonable students would view the equal
access grant to the religious group as conveying the school's
endorsement of religion, for two major reasons. First, because
the other group(s) utilizing the student forum may discuss subjects indirectly related to the curriculum, a reasonable inference
could arise that all student groups are essentially indirect extensions of the curriculum, and hence school supported.2 44 Second,
because the other group(s) utilizing the student forum may be
few in number and small in size, 245 the school's creation of the
forum could reasonably be perceived as having the purpose or
246
the effect of assisting the student religious groups.
Yet another distinction between the constitutionally-grounded
prerequisites for equal access proposed in this Article and the
prerequisites specified in the Act leads to additional situations
where equal access grants could comply with the Act but nevertheless violate the Establishment Clause. This distinction concerns the content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations
that the Article recommends be imposed before student religious
groups are entitled to equal access. 247 The Act at least arguably

requires schools to impose two of these regulations: that student
group meetings be scheduled outside the compulsory attendance
period, 248 and that the role of any adult participant in student
244This

specific danger has already been recognized in the Mergens lawsuit, a case

decided under the Equal Access Act, discussed supra text accompanying notes 208-16.
See Mergens, slip op. at 10-11.
245The Act could be triggered by a request to meet made by a single group consisting

of only two students. See 20 U.S.C. § 4071(d)(6) (Supp. 1985) ("Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize the United States or any State or political
subdivision thereof ... to limit the rights of groups of students which are not of a
specified numerical size.").
.46 Under the Act, once a school is deemed to have created a limited open forum, it
would be required to grant equal access to all noncurriculum related student groups,

regardless of subject, as a matter of policy. However, this policy obligation does not
assure that, in any particular situation, a school's forum will actually include student
groups discussing diverse political, philosophical, religious, or other subjects. The Act's
exclusive focus on a school's policy of openness to diverse subjects, and its complete
disregard for the actual diversity, leads to situations where a school may comply with
the Act yet still violate the Establishment Clause. See infra note 252. See also infra

text accompanying note 251.

247See supra text accompanying notes 149-53.

248The Act provides that a limited open forum is created when student groups meet
during "noninstructional time," 20 U.S.C. § 4071(b) (Supp. 1985), which is defined in

20 U.S.C. § 4072(4) (Supp. 1985) as "time set aside by the school before actual classroom
instruction begins or after actual classroom instruction ends." As discussed supra at
text accompanying notes 172-74, it is not completely clear that this term refers only to
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group meetings be confined to a custodial one. 249 However, the

Act clearly does not require schools to impose the remaining
regulation. Specifically, the Act does not precondition equal

access upon a school's making of disclaimers or explanatory
statements to assure that students understand its neutral
posture.
A school's failure to comply with this final recommended
condition (as well as its failure to comply with the other two
recommended conditions) would not necessarily cause an equal
access grant to violate the Establishment Clause; it would sim-

ply increase the likelihood of such a violation. 25 0 What is disturbing about the Act, then, is not its failure to make this condition an essential prerequisite for the finding of a limited open
forum or the granting of equal access to a student religious
group. Rather, the Act's critical shortcoming in this regard is
its failure to take the school's disclaimer policies into account,
to any extent whatsoever, as relevant to the legal propriety of

equal access grants. So far as the Act is concerned, a school
could fail to give students any explanation of the Equal Access
times before and after the compulsory attendance period, but the weight of legislative
history suggests that it does.
Even if the Act is interpreted to permit student meetings only before or after regular
classes, it clearly does not require that the meetings occur only at times clearly separated
from the compulsory attendance period, as this Article urges supra at text accompanying
note 151. Meetings of a student religious group immediately before or after the normal
school day are more likely to cause reasonable student perceptions of school approval
of religion than are meetings at more clearly separated times. Therefore, a court should
carefully scrutinize any student religious group meeting which occurs, for example,
immediately before the school day, to determine whether reasonable students infer that
the school supports religion. If so, these meetings should be struck down under the
Establishment Clause, notwithstanding their compliance with the Equal Access Act.
See Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist. No. 70, 766 F.2d 1391, 1405 n.14 (10th Cir.
1985) (where student religious group met shortly before school day began and was
observed by other students arriving for classes, reasonable perceptions could arise that
school supported religious group).
249See 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(5) (Supp. 1985) (limiting sponsorship of any meeting by
school or government, or their agents or employees) and 20 U.S.C. § 4072(2) (Supp.
1985) (defining sponsorship as including participation in meeting, but not attendance at
meeting "for custodial purposes"). As discussed supra at text accompanying notes 18490, however, it is unclear whether this limitation is mandatory or discretionary.
The Act contains another provision concerning the role of school employees in student
group meetings, which could potentially lead to Establishment Clause problems. In 20
U.S.C. § 4071(d)(4) (Supp. 1985), the Act provides that it shall not be construed "to
compel any school agent or employee to attend a school meeting if the content of the
speech at the meeting is contrary to the beliefs of the agent or employee." If a school
implements this provision by assigning to student religious groups adult supervisors
whose beliefs accord with those of the students, a risk is created that reasonable students
would perceive the school (through its designated supervisors) as endorsing the students'
religious beliefs.
250See Strossen, supra note 22.
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Act or the constitutional concepts it implicates. Such a failure
would increase the risk that reasonable students would perceive
a student religious group meeting as conveying the school's
approval of religion. Yet it would have no legal impact under
the Act.
The Equal Access Act's failure to take account of any other
factors besides those it lists further compounds the likelihood
that an equal access grant to a student religious group could
comply with the Act but violate the Establishment Clause. Under this Article's constitutionally-based analysis, in contrast,
any other factors which could indicate reasonable student perceptions that the school endorses religion may be cited to overcome a prima facie equal access right. For example, one such
factor would include the relative dominance of student religious
groups in the forum. As is the case regarding explanatory statements, these other factors are not absolutely determinative of
the constitutional propriety of an equal access grant. For example, it would remain -possible, although less likely, for students not to perceive an equal access grant as conveying a
school's endorsement of religion, even if religious groups predominate within the forum.251 Again, the Act's critical flaw is
not its failure to treat such factors as controlling, but rather its
2 52
failure to treat them as having any significance whatsoever.
Another important category of situations where the Act purports to authorize or to require equal access grants which would
violate the Constitution results from the Act's application to
"secondary schools. 2 53 Some state laws define "secondary
schools" to include junior high or middle schools, with the result
2$1See

"I In

supra note 161.

upholding the student religious group's equal access claim in Widmar, the

Supreme Court emphasized the large number and diversity of student groups meeting

in the university forum, and the relatively insignificant role that the single religious
group would play in this context. 454 U.S. 263, 274-75. Moreover, the Court expressly
indicated that if at some future time these factors should shift, causing student religious
groups to predominate in the actual use of the forum, then Establishment Clause
concerns might preclude the religious groups from continuing to meet. See supra note
161. If the relative number of student religious groups meeting in a university forum
could cause university students to perceive the university as endorsing religion, a
fortiori, the relative number of student religious groups meeting in a high school forum
could cause reasonable high school students to perceive the high school as endorsing
religion. See supra text accompanying note 68. Therefore, the Act's complete disregard
of this predominance factor could lead to situations in which it would sanction an equal
access grant that would violate constitutional norms. For example, as noted supra at
text accompanying notes 241-43, the Act would authorize a school to maintain a forum
in which all the student groups are religious.
213See

20 U.S.C. §§ 4071(a), 4072(1) (Supp. 1985).
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that their students could be as young as eleven years old. 254
Therefore, the Act treats these younger students as per se capable of distinguishing between a school's neutral provision of
a forum and its partisan endorsement of student speech within
the forum.255 In contrast, two circuit courts of appeals have
ruled that even the older students in senior high schools are per
se incapable of making this distinction, 25 6 and the Supreme
Court's most recent discussion of student free speech rights
reflects a presumption that high school students are inherently
immature, impressionable, and hence easily harmed by speech
25 7
which is potentially controversial or upsetting.
In particular cases, evidence may well demonstrate that reasonable younger students cannot appreciate the public forum
concept, and that they would consequently view their schools'
equal access grants to student religious groups as manifesting
the schools' support for religion. In such cases, any equal access
grant would violate the Establishment Clause, notwithstanding
its compliance with the Equal Access Act.
2. Some Denials of Equal Access May Comply with the Free
Speech Clause but Violate the Act
In one significant respect, the distinctions between constitutionally-grounded equal access standards and the statutory standards contained in the Act result in the latter imposing increased
obligations upon schools. Specifically, viewed from the schools'
perspective, the Act reduces their discretion to define the subject matter encompassed by a student forum, which they would
enjoy under recent Supreme Court precedents concerning the

2
See AJC GUIDE, supra note 166, app. A, at 25-27 (New York and South Carolina
are examples of states whose laws define "secondary school" as including grades as low
as the seventh).
25 The Act's legislative history suggests that its sponsors actually intended to limit it
to high schools. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. S8347 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement
of Sen. Danforth (R-Mo.)) (stating that Act covers "kids who are freshmen through
seniors in high school. It is [applicable to] people who are 14 through 18 years of age").
216 See Brandon v. Board of Educ. of Guilderland Cent. School Dist., 635 F.2d 978;
Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1046-47.
These decisions are discussed supra text accompanying notes 71-75.
"I See Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3163, supra text accompanying
notes 55-62.
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limited public forum and nonpublic forum concepts. 258 Viewed
from the students' perspective, these distinctions increase their
2 59
free speech and associational rights at school.
Under the Act, so long as a school makes its premises available to even one student group deemed to fit within the expansively conceived "noncurriculum related" category, then it forfeits the discretion to deny access to or exclude any other group
that is also noncurriculum related. 260 To cite an example derived
from the legislative history, if a school granted access to a
student chess club,26 ' it probably would not be able to exclude
or discriminate against clubs of student Communists, Ku Klux
Klansmen, Hare Krishnas, or Black Muslims on the basis of
28 See supra text accompanying notes 182-83. The Act's imposition of a greater
obligation to afford equal access than the one schools bear under constitutional principles is not in itself an unlawful result. Congress has the power to impose such an
obligation upon schools receiving federal financial aid, which are the only schools
covered by the Act. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (Supp. 1985). See Pennhurst State School and
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) ("[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the
spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the
States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.").
Nor is there any constitutional impediment to Congress' imposition of this increased
obligation to grant equal access. It could be argued that school officials have a constitutional right to avoid the reasonable inference that they endorse ideas with which they
do not actually agree. Cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (striking down New
Hampshire's requirement that state motto, "Live Free or Die," be displayed on car
license plates, as violating First Amendment right to "refrain from speaking"). However,
courts have held that when there is a legal obligation to facilitate the expression of ideas
regardless of their content, as in a public forum, then no imputation of endorsement
could arise which would be deemed sufficiently reasonable to violate this right. See,
e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). Accordingly, if a school
has created a limited open forum under the Act, a school official's free speech right to
avoid apparent endorsement of certain ideas should not justify exclusion of student
groups that Congress has defined as entitled to participate in such a forum.
219See, e.g., HOFSTRA NOTE, supra note 23, at 592 ("[T]he Equal Access Act has
expanded the freedoms of speech and assembly of public secondary school students in
an unprecedented manner."). The Note articulates two major bases for this conclusion:
(1) in contrast to Widmar, which seemed to require the presence of many student groups
before finding a forum sufficient to trigger equal access rights, the Act is triggered by
only a single noncurriculum related group, id. at 604; and (2) arguments that could have
been made under Free Speech Clause principles to restrict access rights of controversial
or divisive groups are less forceful under the Act, id. at 612-13.
260If a school could lawfully bar the meetings of any club for reasons apart from their
subject matter, it would retain the authority to do so under the Act. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 4071(c)(4) (Supp. 1985) (school may bar meeting that materially and substantially
interferes with orderly conduct of school's educational activities); id. § 4071(d)(5) (Act
does not authorize school to sanction meetings that are otherwise unlawful); id.
§ 4071(d)(7) (Act does not authorize school to abridge constitutional rights of any
person); id. § 4071(f) (Act does not limit school's authority to maintain order and
discipline, and to protect well-being of students and faculty),
21 See 130 CONG. REC. S8342 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statements of Sen. Gorton
and Sen. Hatfield) (indicating that a school would have difficulty making a determination
that a chess club was curriculum related, notwithstanding the discretion the Act ostensibly grants schools to determine which clubs should be so classified).
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subject matter.2 62 In short, the Act posits two extremes in terms
of a forum's subject matter: either only the narrow range of
subjects that are directly related to the curriculum, or the literally infinite range of subjects that are not.
Under current constitutional standards, in contrast, a school
should be able to create a student forum that would include
some, but not all, noncurriculum related groups.2 63 Many
schools have apparently chosen such an intermediate option,
granting access to clubs that have some indirect relationship to
the schools' educational mission, but not those espousing controversial and potentially divisive religious, political, or philosophical views. 264 As demonstrated by the judicial decisions
262The Act's legislative history is unclear as to whether so-called "hate groups," or
groups discriminating on the basis of race, sex, religion, or other invidious factors were
intended to be excludable. See 130 CONG. REc. S8344, S8347 (daily ed. June 27, 1984)
(statements of Sen. Gorton and Sen. Hatfield). See HOFSTRA Note, supra note 23, at

594-97, 612-14 (Act would probably require access to be granted to "hate groups" if
any other student political groups are allowed to meet).
For a sample "parade of horribles" that educational institutions would have to tolerate
under an open student forum, see, e.g., Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544
F.2d 162, 167 (4th Cir. 1976) (Markey, J., concurring) (upholding equal access right of
gay university student organization) ("[A]ssociations devoted to peaceful advocacy of
decriminalization or social acceptance of sadism, euthanasia, masochism, murder, genocide, segregation, master-race theories, gambling, voodoo, and the abolishment of all
higher education, to list a few, must be granted registration ... if [the university]
continues to "register" [student] associations.").
Positively viewed, it could be argued that a student forum which is open to such
controversial groups would not only enhance students' free speech and associational
rights while they are in school, but would also foster their development into citizens
who responsibly exercise their rights and are tolerant of the rights of others. These
themes pervade the legislative history of the Equal Access Act. See supra note 6.
263See supra text accompanying notes 179-81.
264Of the reported equal access cases, only Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist.,
106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986) contains any description of the various student groups which
meet at school. Additionally, papers filed in two of the unreported cases-Mergens v.
Bd. of Educ. of Westside Community Schools, No. CV 85-0-426, slip op. (D. Neb. May
23, 1985) and Amidei v. Spring Branch Independent School District, No. H-84-4673,
slip op. (S.D. Tex. July 1, 1985)-contain information about the student groups which
met at the respective schools. All three of these student forums included some clubs
that would probably be deemed "noncurriculum related" under the Act (indeed, the
courts in Mergens and Amidei so ruled, see supra text accompanying note 214), but all
of the clubs seemed to be connected to the curriculum at least indirectly, see supra text
accompanying notes 226-27. Certainly, none of the clubs meeting at any of these schools
centered their activities around politics, philosophy, or any other potentially controversial or divisive subject. See Bender, 741 F.2d at 543; Mergens, slip op. at 6; Amidei,
slip op. at 2. See also Affidavit of James A. Findley, Principal of Westside High School,
supra note 214, at
14-17 (the "goals, objectives, and activities" of all student clubs
"are related to the curriculum" in that they are "substantially similar to or the same as
the activities and requirements of one or more" classes, or are "logical and natural
expansions or extensions of the subject matter" of such classes; it is school's intent not
to permit student clubs that are "controversial or divisive").
A survey conducted by the American Association of School Administrators, although
yielding relatively few responses, is consistent with the pattern revealed by the reported
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which have been issued under the Act, this type of line-drawing,
although probably authorized by recent Free Speech Clause
265
doctrine, would not be permissible under the Act.
V. EQUAL ACCESS POLICY OPTIONS CONSISTENT WITH BOTH
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE EQUAL ACCESS ACT

It is important for schools to be aware of the significant extent
to which the Act circumscribes their range of choices in defining
a student forum's subject matter. Schools should be cognizant
that if they grant access to any group which could be deemed
"noncurriculum related," in accordance with the broad construction of that term in the Act's legislative history, then they
face a substantial risk that they could be precluded from thereafter denying access to any group based on its subject matter,
even if they have not intentionally created a forum for all non266
curriculum related speech.

decisions. See AASA GUIDELINES, supra note 151, at 19-20. Of the 161 school districts
which responded to the question "Are there organizations that are currently barred from
free use of school facilities?," only 22 answered that no groups were denied access; 83
responded that "violent/hate or extremist groups" would be barred; 37 said that "subversive groups (advocating the violent overthrow of the government)" would be barred;
25 said that "religious groups" would be barred; 23 said that "religious cults" would be
barred; and somewhat smaller numbers of school districts indicated that they would bar
various other groups, including "profit-making groups," "groups that advocate illegal
activities or offended community morals," "socially controversial groups," and "political
clubs/parties."
265 Although the Mergens and Amidei courts have manifested divergent views concerning the Establishment Clause issues raised by the Act, both courts agreed that the
term "noncurriculum related" must be interpreted broadly, and consequently that the
Act becomes applicable whenever a school grants an opportunity to meet to any club
not directly related to the curriculum. See supra text accompanying notes 214, 226-27.
266 For example, in the Student Coalition for Peace v. Lower Merion School Dist.
case, discussed supra at text accompanying notes 193-207, the school was required to
grant access to a student-initiated anti-nuclear gathering because it had previously
granted access to a student-initiated charitable athletic event. This order was issued
even though the school plainly had been unaware that the consequence of allowing the
charitable athletic event would be its obligation to host the anti-nuclear event. To the
contrary, the school had consistently distinguished between charitable athletic eventsto which it did grant access-and political events-to which it did not. See supra text
accompanying notes 204-07. In contrast, under current constitutional analysis, a school
would not be deemed to have created a limited public forum on its property in the face
of evidence that it did not intend to do so. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense
Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3450.
In its opinion denying plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, the court in
Mergens, slip op. at 11, noted that the Act "may tend to mandate the opening of a
forum well beyond that which the school itself has sought to sanction." As the court
explained, the high school had granted access to student groups that should probably
be deemed "noncurriculum related" under the Act's relatively broad construction of
that term. Nonetheless, the subject matter scope of these groups was still "narrow" and
"much more limited" than that of the groups involved in Widmar. Mergens, slip op. at
11 n.l. In particular, the court stressed that the Widmar forum, in contrast with the
high school forum, included groups "of various political and philosophical leanings."
Id.
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It is also important for schools to be aware of the equal access
policy options that remain available to them, consistent with

both the Act and applicable constitutional precepts. First, a
school could forego all federal financial aid and thus be ex-

empted from compliance with the Act.2 67 Assuming that a school
remains subject to the Act's requirements, it still has a range of
equal access policy options which would allow it to avoid granting equal access to all noncurriculum related groups, regardless
of subject matter.
Even if a school has created a limited open forum, it retains
the discretion to discontinue that forum by declaring that it will

henceforth not permit noncurricular clubs to meet during noninstructional time. 268 Under current public forum case law, such

a change in policy would probably be sustained so long as the
school could show that this change was reasonable and not made
2 69
for the sole purpose of suppressing a particular viewpoint. If
the school's decision to prohibit meetings of noncurriculum related student clubs coincided with an access request by a con-

troversial religious, political, or philosophical group, an inference might arise that the school's decision was intended, at least

in part, to suppress a particular viewpoint. Even so, it would
probably be difficult to demonstrate that the decision had no
other purpose.

Although a school could permissibly restrict its forum to those
student clubs which satisfy the Act's curriculum related con-

cept, even if it had previously maintained a more open forum,
it could well prefer not to do so. Instead, the school might prefer

to make its forum available to a broader subject matter range in
267This possibility was noted by the Third Circuit in the Merion case. See 776 F.2d
at 442 n.9.
26 For example, after passage of the Equal Access Act, the Boulder, Colorado School
Board eliminated any limited open forum which had existed in its schools by henceforth
granting access only to curriculum related groups whose "function is to enhance the
participants' educational experience and supplement the course materials" used at
school. 29 CHRISTIANITY TODAY 49 (Feb. 1, 1985).
269See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 46 (government
may designate property as limited public forum subject to access restrictions that are
reasonable and not intended to suppress expression merely because public officials
oppose speaker's viewpdint; government retains right to revoke designation of such
property as limited public forum). It would be unreasonable to construe the Act as
requiring a school which had triggered its application to remain subject to the Act's
requirements in perpetuity, especially when-as in the Merion case-a school may have
become subject to the Act unwittingly. This conclusion is supported by the indications
in the Act's legislative history that Congress did not intend to limit schools' discretion
concerning the institution of a limited open forum. See, e.g., 130. CONG. REC. S8342
(daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatfield).
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order both to expand its students' educational opportunities and
to promote free speech values. 270 The legislative history indicates that a major purpose of the Act was to promote students'
free speech and associational rights. 271 It would therefore be
ironic if the Act's practical effect were to reduce these rights
by deterring schools from creating student forums. 272 Accordingly, it is essential for schools to understand the ways in which
they may continue to grant access to student clubs with a
broader subject matter scope than those directly related to the
curriculum, while still not waiving the discretion to impose some
subject matter limitations on the forum's scope.
A school could accomplish these important goals while probably still retaining the option of precluding any religious, political, or philosophical club from meeting on an equal basis by
failing to take other necessary steps to trigger the Act's applicability, besides permitting a noncurriculum related student
group to meet. For example, even a school's grant of access to
noncurriculum related clubs would fail to trigger its obligation
to grant equal access to other clubs if the noncurriculum related
clubs met during "instructional" time. 271 Consistent with the
reading of that term indicated by the Act's legislative history, a
school could, for example, authorize some noncurriculum related student groups to meet during a student activity period
occurring during the school day, without thereby incurring the
obligation to grant equal access to all noncurriculum related
groups. 274

To the extent that the additional conditions listed outside the
Act's central provision might be deemed mandatory rather than
discretionary, 275 a school's failure to comply with one or more
such conditions could preserve its discretion to impose reasonable, viewpoint neutral, subject matter limitations upon a stu271Many schools currently opt for such an intermediate subject matter range, broader
than "curriculum related" under the Act, yet narrower than "noncurriculum related."
See supra note 264.
271 See supra note 6.
272 See GEORGETOWN Note, supra note 189, at 223 & n.l 12 (suggesting that, to avoid
discouraging schools from opening their property to expressive activity, courts should
construe Act narrowly and uphold any reasonable criteria for restricting access).
20 U.S.C. § 4071(b) (Supp. 1985).
24 To comport with current constitutional standards, any definition of the permissible
subject matter of the noncurriculum related student groups which could meet during
noninstructional time would have to be reasonable and not imposed for the sole purpose
of suppressing particular viewpoints. See supra text accompanying notes 179-80.
' See supra text accompanying notes 184-90.
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dent forum without forcing it to grant access to all noncurriculum related groups. For example, a school could require
276
teachers to play a participatory role in student group meetings,
or it could require that all clubs be school sponsored. 277 Of.
colrse, to the extent that these conditions are constitutionally
required before a school may grant equal access to a student
religious group, the consequence of noncompliance would be
the school's forfeiture of discretion to permit religious group
meetings .278
VI. CONCLUSION

In declining to address the merits of Bender, the Supreme
Court failed to provide guidance to the numerous courts,
schools, and other parties all over the country which confront
equal access issues. These parties must therefore devise their
own resolutions of the competing free speech and nonestablishment concerns underlying any equal access issue. Moreover,
these parties must forge their own reconciliations of the inconsistent judicial and statutory directives specifically applicable to
equal access problems. These include the four courts of appeals
decisions which unanimously rejected the constitutionally-based
equal access claims they considered; the Equal Access Act,
which requires schools to grant equal access to student religious
groups even under circumstances where the courts of appeals
have held that equal access would violate the Establishment
Clause, and the Supreme Court has indicated that equal access
was not mandated by the Free Speech Clause; and the reported
decisions under the Act, which reflect significantly differing
views about its constitutionality.
This Article has attempted to provide the guidance to parties
involved in equal access disputes which has not been provided
by either the Supreme Court or Congress. The Article has suggested standards for resolving the conflicting constitutional con276 See supra note 214 (principal's affidavit submitted in Mergens case contended that
school policy required teachers to sponsor all student clubs, thus exempting school
from Act's coverage).
27 But see supra text accompanying notes 223-24 (in Amidei, school was found to
have limited open forum under Act, obligating it to grant equal access to student religious
group, notwithstanding school rule that all clubs be school sponsored).
278See supra note 190 and accompanying text (conditions imposed by 20 U.S.C.
§ 4071(c) (Supp. 1985) may be constitutionally required before school may grant access
to student religious club).
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cerns implicated in every equal access case which are faithful
to both of the fundamental First Amendment rights at issue.
The Article has also contrasted its proposed constitutionallyderived standards for evaluating equal access claims with those
prescribed in the Equal Access Act. Based upon this comparative analysis, the Article has demonstrated that the Act is more
protective of free speech values than of nonestablishment values, and that in comparison with current Supreme Court doctrine, the Act affords more protection to free speech interests
in a limited student forum while affording less protection to
nonestablishment interests. Consequently, the Article has
shown that an equal access grant may comply with the Act yet
violate the Establishment Clause, while an equal access denial
could comply with the Free Speech Clause yet violate the Act.
Finally, the Article has set out the range of equal access policy
options that are available to a school, consistent with the requirements of both the Constitution and the Equal Access Act.
By complying with the constitutionally-based standards proposed in this Article, schools can maximize students' rights of
free expression and association, as well as their right to remain
free from governmental establishments of religion. Our nation's
public schools can thereby promote their essential mission of
teaching young people that constitutional liberties are vitally
important in the everyday lives of all Americans, including students throughout the nation, and that these precious freedoms
should not be "discount[ed] ... as mere platitudes. ' 279

279See West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) ("That [boards

of education] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection
of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at
its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes.").

